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ABSTRACT 
The current trend in terrorist tactics is the use of simple, inexpensive and 
conventional weapons. One such weapon is improvised incendiary devices (IIDs).  The 
homeland security community has underestimated the magnitude of the threat.  Policy 
makers must recognize the potential for terrorist cells to use IIDs to create terror and fear 
in the public.  IIDs have the potential to create devastating fires resulting in mass 
casualties. 
In addition to evaluating the risk of an IID attack and determining the state of 
preparedness of first responders, this thesis includes a proposal for the creation of two 
new national planning scenarios, urban and wildland conflagrations or firestorms.  
Recommendations will include incendiary protocols in the weapon of mass destruction 
matrix as represented by “I” in CBIRNE.  This organizational change can be applied to 
the homeland security strategies, lexicons and documents of Federal, State, and local 
governments and the private sector to address the IID threat. 
This thesis is intended to serve as a catalyst for the Department of Homeland 
Security to set policy that will decrease vulnerabilities and consequences of this lesser-
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Terrorists choose their targets and weapons based on weaknesses in preparedness 
and defense. Presently, the homeland security community does not recognize the 
magnitude of the threat improvised incendiary devices (IIDs) pose as a terrorist weapon, 
and the community is prepared neither to prevent nor respond to this simple and 
ubiquitous threat. Most of the research on improvised devices has overlooked IIDs and 
their lethality. Despite historical evidence to suggest the continued and increased use of 
fire as a weapon, most research on terrorist weapons has focused primarily on chemical, 
biological, radiological, nuclear and explosives (CBRNE), ignoring fire’s devastating 
potential. 
Fire is a simple, inexpensive, and easily employed weapon, and will be used as a 
terrorist weapon in the future. It is essential that the homeland security community 
recognize that terrorists worldwide will deploy cells using IIDs to create panic and 
disruption. Extreme events like firestorms or conflagrations will overwhelm first 
responders and fire suppression systems as they destroy large areas of cities, towns, and 
wildland-urban interface (WUI). 
The United States’ hazardous materials cargo offers the same opportunity that 
airliners provided on 9/11: the chance to transform hazardous materials vehicles into 
mobile weapons of war. Thousands of trips are made each day by gasoline tankers, many 
of which hold as much fuel as a Boeing 757. The September 11, 2001 attacks on the 
World Trade Center proved that terrorists can create fires larger than our buildings are 
designed to withstand. A performance study of buildings at the WTC site by a team of 
civil, structural, and fire protection engineers concluded it was the fire, rather than the 
impact from the planes, that ultimately caused the collapse of the WTC towers.   
The physiological and psychological consequences of fire and an IID attack are 
severe. A large-scale IID attack would quickly overwhelm medical facilities with burn 
victims due to the limited number of beds at burn center hospitals throughout the country.   
 
 xvi
The idea of dying by fire is abhorrent, triggering intense fear. Incendiary attacks are 
psychologically repellant as well as physically traumatic, making this technique 
appealing to terrorists.   
This thesis will examine the threats, vulnerabilities and consequences of IID 
attacks, and determine the state of preparedness of first responders. It will generate two 
new proposed national planning scenarios: Planning scenarios #16 IID - Urban 
Conflagration/Firestorm and #17 IID - Wildland and Wildland-Urban Interface (WUI) 
Conflagration/Firestorm. Recommendations will be made to include incendiaries in the 
WMD matrix as represented by “I” in CBIRNE. This conceptual and organizational 
change can be applied to the homeland security strategies, lexicons and documents by the 




























                                                
I. INTRODUCTION 
Fire knows no human boundaries. It does not recognize wealth or poverty, 
property or political lines. It does not distinguish between abandoned structures or places 
we consider valuable. It does not stop to consider the economic, social, or aesthetic value 
of something. It will burn whatever is in its path, as it has always done, and always will.  
Fire is nondiscriminatory, and thus can affect any of us.1   
Terrorists have used fire in the past and are acutely aware of its potential as a 
weapon. The homeland security community, on the other hand, does not fully recognize 
fire as a threat. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and other members of the 
larger homeland security community are overlooking the obvious terrorist weapon – 
FIRE. While tremendous emphasis is placed on non-conventional weapons like chemical, 
biological and radiological agents, simple and inexpensive improvised incendiary devices 
(IIDs) can be used to meet the terrorist’s objectives.  
These objectives are clear: create mass anxiety and fear, and generate a sense of 
helplessness in a free society. A successful terrorist attack erodes the public’s sense of 
security and exposes weaknesses in those responsible for protecting us. Fire is the ideal 
weapon to accomplish these objectives. There are hundreds of ways IIDs and fire could 
be used as a terrorist weapon, but the simple scenarios below indicate some of the 
potential chaos and gravity of IID attacks.   
While families in an apartment building sleep, a glass container of gasoline is 
thrown at the base of the staircase and ignited. The fire races up the stairs, trapping and 
killing innocent men, women, and children. The tactic is employed simultaneously a few 
houses away. These attacks are repeated every night in different neighborhoods for a 
week. People throughout the city are petrified. 
Members of a terrorist cell rent an apartment in midtown Manhattan, and begin 
to stockpile insect repellant, acetone and assorted other solvents a little at a time in the 
apartment. They cut holes in the sheetrock and expose the steel structural members, 
 
1 National Interagency Fire Center, “The I-Zone: A Human Dimension of Wildland Fire,” 
http://www.nifc.gov/preved/comm_guide/wildfire/fire_9.html, [accessed July 17, 2006]. 
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scraping off the fireproofing. In the middle of the night, they open up the gas valves on 
the stove, spread the flammables, set a timer and leave the apartment.2 One member of 
the group is in the basement sabotaging the fire suppression system.   
An 8,000-gallon gasoline truck is hijacked, driven into the lobby of a high-rise 
multiple dwelling and ignited. Thousands of people are trapped above the fire and 
rescuers are unable to reach them. The victims begin jumping from the upper floors to 
escape the flames. The fires are burning out of control and the structural steel columns 
supporting the building are showing signs of failure. As the fire extends to the upper 
floors of the building, the Incident Commander orders all first responders to evacuate the 
building. 
In a neighborhood of the North Bronx, blocks and blocks of Queen Anne wood- 
frame dwellings line the streets. On a windy night when firefighters are busy 
extinguishing fires on the opposite side of the city, members of a terrorist cell 
simultaneously ignite an entire block of homes. These fires burn so intensely that other 
homes nearby burst into flames from the radiant heat and flying brands. In a short period 
of time, fires are raging throughout the neighborhood, developing into a conflagration 
and engulfing the entire North Bronx. 
A drought is taking place in the Northeast and the reservoirs are low. The 
conifers in the Pine Barrens of New Jersey are extremely dry. Using timed incendiary 
devices, members of a terrorist cell ignite scores of wildfires in close proximity of each 
other near the perimeter of the Pine Barrens and adjacent local communities. The fires 
grow and merge into one extremely large fire developing into a firestorm, threatening the 
nearby communities. 
The outcome of each of these scenarios is easy to predict. Any one of them could 
accomplish the terrorist’s objectives, but imagine if they occurred at the same time - al 





2 Vincent Doherty, FDNY HazMat Specialist, email correspondence with the author July 8, 2006. 
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A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Terrorists choose their targets and weapons based on weaknesses in our 
preparedness and defense. They continue to use conventional weapons, especially 
improvised explosive devices (IEDs) as their weapon of choice.3 Unlike IEDs, 
improvised incendiary devices (IIDs) use low explosives that do not produce shattering 
shock or massive pressure waves. They do, however, produce fires that can cause 
significantly more damage than a comparable amount of explosives. IIDs can range from 
a crudely-designed, homemade incendiary device to more advanced devices using 
commercial or military incendiaries. The majority of these weapons are easily 
manufactured, inexpensive, readily available and simple to use. With respect to intent, 
capability and sophistication, IIDs in the hands of terrorist groups are also clearly 
distinguishable from simple arson. 
Properly placed IIDs can create fires that have the potential to develop into a 
firestorm or conflagration. These fire phenomena will overwhelm first responders and 
fire suppression systems, destroying large areas of cities, towns, and wildland-urban 
interface (WUI) – an area where private homes or community infrastructure abut or are 
intermixed with trees and other vegetation.4  Extinguishment will be impossible; they 
will continue to burn and expand until all fuel is exhausted.  
The 9/11 Commission Report cites a lack of imagination as one of the failures of 
the intelligence community. Prior to 9/11, the intelligence community failed to recognize 
the significance of the al Qaeda threat.5 Bin Laden employed IIDs – human-guided 
missiles in the form of commercial airliners – to ignite tremendous fires and destroy the 
Twin Towers. Excerpts from a videotape of bin Laden after the 9/11 attacks suggest that 
his intention was to use fire to destroy the Twin Towers: 
 
3 Office of the Dean of Research, Naval Postgraduate School, “Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), 
an NPS Research Update,” November 1, 2005, http://www.nps.edu/Research/documents/IEDupdate.pdf. 
[accessed July 11, 2006]. 
4 Front Range Fuel Treatment Partnership Roundtable, “Living with Fire:  Protecting Communities 
and Restoring Forests,” 
http://www.wilderness.org/Library/Documents/loader.cfm?url=/commonspot/security/getfile.cfm&PageID
=14899, [accessed August 9, 2006]. 
5 9/11 Commission, National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (9/11 
Commission Report) (New York & London:  W.W. Norton & Company, 2004), 339.   
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We calculated in advance the number of casualties from the enemy, who 
would be killed based on the position of the tower. We calculated that the 
floors that would be hit would be three or four floors. I was the most 
optimistic of them all (inaudible) due to my experience in this field, I was 
thinking that the fire from the gas in the plane would melt the iron 
structure of the building and collapse the area where the plane hit and all 
the floors above it only. This is all that we had hoped for.6
It is clear that the IIDs used at the World Trade Center (WTC) in 2001 were WMDs and 
were emphatically more effective than the IEDs used in the 1993 terrorist attack on the 
WTC. Many people, including homeland security professionals, mistakenly equate IIDs 
with IEDs, but IIDs are distinct entities and it is essential they be recognized as a separate 
category of weapon.  
It is vital that the public (the greatest stakeholders in an IID attack), as well as 
future homeland security leaders, understand the threat posed by IIDs. These devices 
weaponize fire and cause more catastrophic loss of life and destruction than the more 
famous WMDs. Most literature on terrorist weapons has focused primarily on chemical, 
biological, radiological, nuclear and explosives (CBRNE) and ignored the devastating 
potential of fire.    
Vincent Brannigan, a fire service expert in the field of building collapse, points 
out that a terrorist arson attack is analogous to but in some ways more serious than an 
attack using explosives.7  Both fires and explosives can cause the progressive collapse of 
a structure. Fire, however, can spread well beyond the outer limits of an explosion and 
weaken structural members remote from the original site. On September 11, 2001 the 
World Trade Center towers collapsed because of the fires, igniting all the surrounding 
buildings and destroying the entire sixteen-acre complex.  
The attacks proved that terrorists can create fires larger than our buildings are 
designed to withstand. In a National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) study, 
it was determined that despite the impact of the two aircraft striking the towers at high 
speed and damaging the principal structural components, the towers would have  
6 CNN.com, “Excerpt from bin Laden tape,” December 13, 2001, 
http://archives.cnn.com/2001/US/12/13/ret.bin.laden.quotes/index.html, [accessed August 1, 2006]. 
7 Vincent Brannigan, “How Do We Regulate the Risk of Terrorism?” Fire Chief Magazine, August 1, 
2002, http://firechief.com/mag/firefighting_regulate_risk_terorism/index.html, [accessed November 1, 
2005]. 
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remained standing were it not for the dislodged fireproofing and the subsequent multiple 
floor fires.8 The tremendous fires generated from the fuel of the two airliners (two large 
IIDs) crashing into the WTC towers ignited combustible materials on a number of floors; 
the resulting fire weakened the structural members, causing the progressive floor-by-floor 
collapse of both 110-story office buildings.    
A region or city attacked by terrorists employing IIDs would generate more burn 
victims that any burn center has the surge capacity, burn victim beds, or other resources 
to handle. Most hospitals can treat the initial burn casualties, but would rapidly become 
taxed as more victims arrived. Once burn victims are stabilized, they require special care 
available only at burn centers. At a congressional briefing with the House Committee on 
Homeland Security on mass burn casualties, Cham E. Dallas, Professor of Toxicology 
and Director of the CDC Center for Mass Destruction Defense at the University of 
Georgia, cautioned members of the committee that burn injuries have emerged as a prime 
worry in his center’s latest studies.9 The point here is that this threat affects every 
discipline and agency in homeland security, particularly the medical and public health 
communities.   
Fires can be set anywhere and any time. Presently, the homeland security 
community does not recognize the magnitude of the threat from arson and IIDs as a 
terrorist weapon, and is thus unprepared for the prevention of or response to this simple 
and ubiquitous threat: 
• Many DHS training programs, exercise activities, and grant funds focus on 
weapons of mass destruction rather than all-hazards and fire. 
• The hazardous materials trucking industry has a tremendous availability of 
incendiary materials and is highly vulnerable to exploitation by terrorists 
groups.  Little has been accomplished by Homeland Security to harden 
this vulnerability. 
• Funding for academic studies on firestorms and conflagrations is limited.   
• There are an insufficient number of burn care centers in the U.S.; a 
catastrophic fire will quickly overwhelm these medical facilities.  
 
8 National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), “Final Report of the National Construction 
Safety Team on the Collapses of the World Trade Center Towers, Executive Summary,” xliii, 
http://wtc.nist.gov/pubs/NCSTAR1ExecutiveSummary.pdf, [accessed August 2, 2006]. 
9 Cham E. Dallas, “U.S. Congressional Briefing with the House Committee on Homeland Security,” 
NY Post, November 10, 2005, http://nypost.com, [accessed December 18, 2005].  
6 
• Incendiary devices are listed in Title 18 of the U.S. Code, but incendiaries 
are grouped as a subset of explosives and not identified in CBRNE. 
• The National Planning Scenario includes five catastrophes that could 
result in massive fires, but fire is mentioned only cursorily in these 
scenarios. 
Unless DHS acknowledges and acts on the threat posed by IIDs, the entire homeland 
security community will remain unprepared to prevent or respond to an attack.  
The goal of this thesis is three-fold. First, it will introduce and define the concept 
of IIDs and argue that the U.S. is not fully prepared for a terrorist attack employing them. 
The nation’s fire departments are able to handle a great many incidents; if properly 
staffed and outfitted, they would be able to handle a great many more. Second, it will 
make the argument that IIDs should be included in the WMD matrix, which would then 
change from CBRNE to CBIRNE. Third, it will generate two new proposed national 
planning scenarios: #16 IID - Urban Conflagration/Firestorm and #17 IID - Wildland and 
WUI Conflagration/Firestorm. Through these recommendations it will contribute to the 
preparedness of the United States as identified in the National Preparedness Goal to 
prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks, major disasters, 
and other emergencies of national significance. 
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
There is a limited amount of research on IIDs as a terrorist tactic, since the term 
itself is new – distinct from but not unrelated to arson and explosives. The second-tier 
research and literature on arson, fire, and explosives are therefore useful as a starting 
point and a frame of reference. The sub-literatures that support the current discussion and 
that will be addressed in this section are documents on the use of fire and incendiary 
devices by nation-states in war; sources on contemporary terrorist groups using arson and 
IIDs; descriptions of hazardous materials transported by the trucking industry as 
alternative weapon or surrogate bombs; information on the effects of fire on the structural 
components of structures and buildings; and the psychological and medical consequences 
affecting victims of an incendiary attack. Other sources include government documents 
guiding the development of the national planning scenarios, as well as the many policy 
and strategy reports, documents and directives for homeland security. 
7 
                                                
Fire and incendiary devices, the oldest known weapons, have long been used as a 
tactic or weapon in warfare. In a study of the history of incendiary devices, the Global 
Security Institute traced the use of incendiaries in battle back to biblical times.10 Another 
source describing the ancient predecessor of napalm, known as Greek Fire, describes how 
Greek Fire clung to everything it touched, ignited any organic material spontaneously, 
and was unable to be extinguished with water. This ancient IID was especially deadly in 
naval combat, and has been cited as a prime reason for the long survival of the Byzantine 
Empire.11   
Fire and incendiary weapons continued to govern the battlefield for hundreds of 
years. When the American Civil War started in 1861 the use of Greek Fire was threatened 
but never used. Flame and incendiary weapons have been used in almost every war.12 
The Germans first employed flamethrowers during World War I against the French at 
Malencourt, and by 1916, Britain and France had utilized flamethrowers as well.  
During World War II, the U.S. Secretary of War directed the development of 
flamethrowers for the U.S. military after the Germans made use of flamethrowers in 
Poland, Belgium, and France.13 In addition to flamethrowers, both Britain and the United 
States conducted research on incendiary bombs. Lynn Eden, in The Whole World on Fire, 
examines the policies of both Britain and the U.S. in deploying incendiary bombs. Both 
countries sought an understanding of the physical processes involved in the spread of fire 
throughout a city and the ability to assess fire damage.14 Fire experts involved in  
 
10 Global Security Institute, “Incendiary Weapons: History,” 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/munitions/incendiary-history.htm, [accessed December 12, 
2005]. 
11 Encyclopedia Britannica, “Greek Fire,” Encyclopedia Britannica Premium Service, 
http://www.britannica.com/eb/article-9037919, [accessed 16 September 2005]. 
12 Global Security Institute, “Incendiary Weapons: History,” 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/munitions/incendiary-history.htm, [accessed December 12, 
2005]. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Lynn Eden, Whole World on Fire: Organizations, Knowledge, and Nuclear Weapons Devastation 
(Ithaca & London: Cornell U. P., 2004), 67. 
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assessing and predicting damage from incendiary weapons determined “area” damage by 
fire, rather than “precision” damage by blast; this was seen as a more effective way to 
degrade enemy capabilities and morale.15   
The U.S. bombing policy during World War II was concerned with precision 
bombing and the resulting blast damage. Eden points out that the area bombing strategy 
with incendiary bombs was more deeply embedded in British doctrine than American.  
Sir Charles Portal, British commander-in-chief of the Bomber Command, supported the 
strategy of dropping a large quantity of incendiaries followed by a sustained attack with 
high explosives to drive the firefighters underground, burst the water mains and let the 
flames get a good hold. Instead of trying to blow up each building with high explosives, 
the aim was to start simultaneous conflagrations in the center of a targeted town such that 
the ensuing fires would consume the whole town, including major target systems such as 
oil refineries, aircraft production, aluminum plants, ports and shipping, communications, 
naval targets, and transport.16 Today, just as during World War II, U.S. policy makers 
and homeland security experts are focused on explosives in the form of IEDs and are 
ignoring the threat of IIDs and fire in a terrorist attack.  
The U.S. military today uses incendiary weapons to attack strongholds in Iraq. 
Mark Sappenfield, in an article published in the Christian Science Monitor, reviews 
evidence that the U.S. used incendiary weapons in the Iraqi city of Fallujah in 2004 
during Operation Iraqi Freedom. According to Sappenfield, white phosphorous rounds 
were used by gunners against insurgents during the battle of Fallujah to set enemy 
positions on fire.17 Though our own military uses incendiary weapons, the homeland 
security community still ignores the threat they pose in the hands of terrorists.  
The use of fire and incendiary weapons by enemy states engaged in formal battle 
is fairly well-known and documented, but fire and incendiary devices have also been used 
asymmetrically. The Ku Klux Klan (KKK) has used fire for over a hundred years to 
 
15 Lynn Eden, Whole World on Fire: Organizations, Knowledge, and Nuclear Weapons Devastation 
(Ithaca & London: Cornell U. P., 2004), 67. 
16 Ibid., 68. 
17 Mark Sappenfield, “Arms Controversy in Iraq,” Christian Science Monitor, November 18, 2005, 
http://www.csmonitor.com/205/1118/p03s01-usmi.html, [accessed November 20, 2005]. 
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spread terror in the African-American population across the country. Fires and fire-
bombings in churches across the U.S. can be classified as incendiary terrorism. The 
Animal Liberation Front (ALF) and Earth Liberation Front (ELF) are two domestic 
extremist groups that consistently use arson as a terrorist weapon.  
IID attacks by Islamic terrorists and others intent on causing the death and 
destruction of innocent civilians could be readily accomplished, for example via the 
hazardous materials trucking industry, where the availability of incendiary material is 
well known. The trucking industry, a major component of the U.S. transportation sector, 
receives much less funding both in raw dollars and proportionate to other transportation 
industries. Saul B. Wilen of International Horizons Unlimited points out the airline 
industry uses billions for security while the trucking industry receives about $500,000 per 
year.  This money is used to train drivers on how to detect and report suspicious activities 
that might have terrorist or national security implications under the Driver Awareness 
Education Program.18 There are over 800,000 hazardous material shipments per day; 
many involve materials that could be used for terrorist attacks of staggering potential for 
deaths, injuries, property damage, and business disruption.19
Some elected officials, such as U.S Senator Charles Schumer (D-NY), are aware 
of the risk to the trucking industry. In May of 2004, Senator Schumer persuaded the U.S. 
Transportation Security Administration to adopt a comprehensive anti-terrorist truck-
bomb plan. The plan requires background checks for every truck driver carrying 
hazardous materials including gasoline. Schumer argued the federal government needs to 
build on this and require background checks of all truck drivers, tracking devices in every 
truck, a database to monitor hazardous materials traveling by road, and federal funds to 
 
18 Saul B. Wilen, “Countering Terrorism Threats: Trucking Industry and Multi-Modal Distribution 
Network Vulnerabilities,” International Horizons Unlimited, Ltd, February 10, 2003, 
http://www.intlhorizons.com/article-trucking.htm, [accessed December 30, 2005]. 
19 Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, Hazardous Materials Safety and Security Technology 
Field Operational Test, Volume 1: Evaluation Final Report Executive Summary, 
http://www.fmcsa.dot.gov/safety-security/hazmat/fot/eval-rpt-summary-part5.htm, [accessed August 2, 
2006].  
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pay overtime to New York City Police Department (NYPD) and Port Authority police 
now checking trucks entering New York City (NYC).20   
As elected officials work to develop legislation to protect against IIDs, first 
responders must develop awareness and knowledge of the threat. Robert Burke, in 
Counter-Terrorism for Emergency Responders, describes the many types of simple and 
inexpensive incendiary devices. An incendiary device requires only an ignition source, a 
flammable or combustible fuel, and some type of housing or container. Some of the 
components used to assemble a device can include flares, motor fuels such as gasoline or 
diesel, electric light bulbs, electrical appliances and components, fireworks, reactive 
chemicals, propane and butane cylinders and plastic pipes, bottles, and cans.21
Because of the ease of obtaining and creating improvised incendiary devices, 
terrorists can use fire as a low-cost weapon of terror. According to Michael J. Karter of 
the National Fire Protection Association, U.S. fire departments in 2005 responded to an 
estimated 31,500 intentionally set structure fires that caused $664 million in property loss 
and 315 deaths.22 The National Center for the Analysis of Violent Crime (NCAVC) 
conducted a study on motive classifications for arson. The study identified vandalism, 
excitement, revenge, crime concealment, profit and terrorism as motivations for arson.23  
Deliberately set fires motivated by spite and revenge are directed at people and can 
therefore be considered weapons. These fires are set specifically to inflict personal and 
emotional harm.  
The idea of death by fire triggers intense fear in most people. Indeed, part of their 
appeal to terrorists is that incendiary attacks are psychologically repellent.  Research on 
natural and human-caused disasters strongly suggests that the psychological reactions 
 
20 Charles Schumer, “Anti-Terror Bomb Plan,” Schumer Website, Press release, 
http://schumer.senate.gov/SchumerWebsite/pressroom/pressreleases/2004/PR02660.Trucksec053004.pf.ht
ml, [November 20, 2005]. 
21 Robert Burke, Counter-Terrorism for Emergency Responders (Boca Raton, Fla.: Lewis Publishers, 
2000), 168. 
22 Michael J. Karter, “Fire Loss in the U.S. during 2005,” National Fire Protection Association, Fire 
Analysis and Research Division, Quincy, Massachusetts, July 2006, iii, 
http://www.nfpa.org/assets/files/PDG/OS.fireloss.pdf, [assessed August 4, 2006]. 
23 American Re-Insurance Company, A Guide to Arson Investigation:  Motive, Means and 
Opportunity (Corporate Communications and Advertising, Department of American Re-Insurance 
Company, 1996, 9, http://www.amre.com/content/rl/arson.pdf, [accessed August 15, 2006].
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following human-caused disasters such as terrorism are more intense and prolonged than 
those following natural disasters. In addition to the physical destruction resulting from an 
incendiary attack, this fear and psychological trauma is a central part of the terrorist’s 
goals.   
The literature offers solid research on both domestic and international groups who 
have used IIDs as a terrorist weapon as well as the medical and psychological effects of 
fire as a weapon. Historical accounts show that fire has always been a favored weapon in 
military operations. Evidence suggests that the trucking industries and other 
transportation sectors will most likely be targeted by terrorists using IIDs.  
C. METHOD 
In addition to evaluating the threat of an IID attack against mandated national 
preparedness strategies and the target capabilities lists to determine the state of 
preparedness of first responders, this thesis will propose two new national planning 
scenarios. Planning scenario #16 addresses conflagrations or firestorms from IIDs in an 
urban setting, while scenario #17 addresses conflagrations or firestorms from IIDs in a 
wildland and WUI environment. These scenarios will complement existing national 
planning scenarios to contribute to the preparedness of the United States from a terrorist 
attack. Recommendations will be made to include incendiary weapons in the WMD 
matrix as represented by “I” in CBIRNE as an organizational change in the federal, state, 
local and private sector to address the IID threat through the Homeland Security 
Strategies, lexicons and documents.  
This thesis uses the protection program strategy for reducing risk of critical 
infrastructure and key resources (CI/KR) from the National Infrastructure Protection 
Plan (NIPP). The risk can be measured or calculated by analyzing the threat, 
vulnerability and consequences of IIDs. Integrated risk-reduction activities for IIDs can 
then be accomplished by employing protective programs that address the threat, 
vulnerability and consequence for each element of risk. 
• Threat – protective programs to reduce threat by lessening vulnerability 
and lowering consequences making targets less attractive to terrorist 
groups.   
• Vulnerability – protective programs to reduce vulnerability by decreasing 
susceptibility to destruction, or exploitation of weaknesses in a system. 
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• Consequences – protective programs must reduce damage of a successful 
attack or natural hazard with redundant system design, back-up systems 
and alternative sources for raw materials. 
D. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
Chapter II discusses in greater detail the concept and definition of IIDs, as well as 
our vulnerability to them; it does so through the lens of the “predictable surprise” 
theoretical framework. It documents the use of arson in riots, protests, for revenge and 
profit, as well as by domestic terrorist groups. This chapter also identifies the danger of 
terrorist groups using the hazardous materials trucking industry as a source of ready-
made IIDs.  Finally, it will address the most common types and properties of incendiary 
materials.   
Chapter III examines the consequences of an IID attack; investigates the potential 
for the development of firestorms or conflagrations in both an urban setting and wildland 
environment; and explores the human factor of this weapon by appraising the 
physiological and psychological consequences of fire and an IID attack. 
Chapter IV suggests two policy changes: to modify the CBRNE matrix to include 
incendiaries, and to include two new scenarios in the National Planning Scenarios, and 
recommends a strategy to implement these changes.   
Chapter V concludes with the importance of the homeland security community 
recognizing the threat of IIDs by taking necessary steps in all four areas of the National 
Preparedness Goal:  prevention; protection; response; and recovery. 
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II. IID THREAT AND VULNERABILITY 
This chapter examines the threats posed by and vulnerabilities to terrorism 
employing IIDs and weaponized fire. It will demonstrate how arson, a simple and 
common tactic among domestic terrorists and criminals, can be advanced by extremist 
terrorist groups intent on producing mass casualties and destruction to create intense fear 
and anxiety in the public.  IIDs were used in the World Trade Center attack on September 
11, 2001 and are readily available in the hazardous materials trucking industry. The 
wildland and WUI, with its latent energy, are waiting to burst into flames from a 
terrorist’s improvised incendiary device. While the disparate sections of this chapter are 
not necessarily new information, taken together as an integrated threat they constitute the 
quintessential “predictable surprise:” the theoretical lens through which this material will 
be viewed.  
A.  PREDICTABLE SURPRISE 
“Predictable surprise” is a term developed by Bazerman and Watkins of the 
Harvard Business School. Predictable surprises are events or disasters that catch leaders 
off-guard even though the latter had all the information necessary to anticipate them.24 
The 9/11 attack, the Enron collapse, and Hurricane Katrina all had warning signs, but 
leaders and organizations either did not recognize the signs or failed to act on them. 
Many catastrophes are predictable, including IID terrorist attacks. Bazerman and Watkins 
propose six distinguishing traits of a predictable surprise, each of which was discernible 
in their example of the September 11 tragedy:  
• Leaders know a problem exists and that it will not solve itself. The 
administrations of George H. W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush 
all knew that aviation security was deficient. These leaders were aware of 
a growing threat, yet failed to mobilize and respond accordingly. 
• The problem is getting worse over time. Report after report told U.S. 
leaders that the nation’s aviation security system was worsening by the 
day, while al Qaeda’s powers to take advantage of this weakness 
increased. 
• There is a perception that fixes are costly and the benefits of those fixes 
are delayed. New security to reduce the likelihood and magnitude of an 
 
24 Max H. Bazerman and Michael D. Watkins, Predictable Surprises: The Disasters You Should Have 
Seen Coming and How to Prevent Them (Boston, Massachusetts: Harvard Business School Press, 2004), 4. 
14 
                                                
attack would have imposed high direct costs on both the federal 
government and the airline industry, and leaders and citizens would have 
seen no immediate or tangible return on their investment of time and 
money.  
• There is no call for action to prevent a predictable surprise. Because the 
U.S. public could not envision the predictable surprise of commercial 
aircraft being used as a missile, aviation security remained a low priority 
for politicians. 
• The natural human tendency is to maintain the status quo. When a system 
still functions and there is no crisis to catalyze action, people will continue 
doing things the way they always have. 
• The final characteristic of predictable surprises is that a small vocal 
minority (special interest groups) benefits from inaction and maintaining 
the status quo, and are thus motivated to subvert the actions of leaders for 
their own personal gain. The airline industry fought hard to block reform 
and manipulated governmental decisions through lobbying and campaign 
donations.25 
It is likely incendiary terrorism could become the next predictable surprise for the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The use of fire as a terrorist weapon has all the 
characteristics of a predictable surprise but it is still not a priority for many homeland 
security experts and disciplines. If awareness is raised, policy makers and the homeland 
security community will take the necessary steps for preparedness and apply the National 
Preparedness Goals of prevention, protection, response, and recovery to IIDs.  
Lynn Eden, associate director for research at Stanford University, emphasizes that 
organizations will define problems and identify solutions based on organizational 
interest.26 She suggests that organizational interest is a social construct that brings 
attention and resources to solve one problem, but may not recognize others.27 In The 
Whole World on Fire, she focuses on organizational shortfalls of the U.S. government 
during World War II to determine how and why the government failed to predict nuclear 
fire damage as it drew up plans to fight strategic nuclear war.  
Besides the failure of imagination, the 9/11 Commission Report reveals three 
additional failures: policy, capability, and management, all the result of organizational 
 
25 Bazerman and Watkins, Predictable Surprises, 5-7. 
26 Eden, Whole World on Fire, 48. 
27 Ibid, 50. 
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shortfalls.28 DHS was established to overcome these limitations, but IIDs and fires are 
still not recognized as a threat. When the strategic plans were developed for nuclear war 
during the Cold War era, the U.S. failed to predict nuclear fire damage; DHS fails 
similarly to recognize the threat of IIDs. One explanation for this failure could be that 
there are still organizational shortfalls in DHS – inherent in DHS are organizational 
biases and favoritism toward law enforcement agencies, which in turn seem to focus 
exclusively on the CBRNE threat.29
Eden gives examples of these organizational shortfalls. She questions how 
organizations build knowledge when they have little or no experience from which to 
learn. For example, Thomas Andrews of Harland & Wolff, the shipbuilders of the R.M.S. 
Titanic, did not understand just how brittle the steel plates used in its construction were 
until it struck an iceberg. In another instance, the builders of the World Trade Center 
designed the towers to withstand the impact of a Boeing 707, the largest airliner of the 
early 1960s, but not to withstand the fire that would be produced by the many thousands 
of gallons of jet fuel burning inside the building as a result.30  This phenomenon may be 
happening now in DHS. A great deal of effort is directed toward the CBRNE threat, but 
IIDs and fire continue to be ignored.   
B. FIRE, IIDS, AND TERRORISM 
1. Arson  
Fire has long been and will continue to be used as a criminal tool. Under modern 
statutes, the definition of arson includes the crime of a malicious act of burning a 
dwelling or other structure such as bridges, vehicles and private property, where the fire 
causes actual damage of the property.31 In general, the public views arson as a crime of 
fraud affecting insurance companies, though local street gangs and criminal organizations 
also use arson to control or terrorize their victims and force compliance or silence.  
Arson was used extensively in New York City during the 1960s and 70s, when 
many neighborhoods in Brooklyn and the Bronx were burned down by landlords wishing  
28 9/11 Commission, 9/11 Commission Report, 339. 
29 Joseph Pfeifer, “Dirty Fires: Radiological Incendiary Devices,” With New York Firefighters (WNYF) 
2 (2006): 13. 
30 Eden, Whole World on Fire, 5. 
31 Arson Definition, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arson, [accessed 11 April 2006].  
16 
                                                
to collect insurance money for their dilapidated, vacant buildings. After the fire, social 
services would relocate displaced families into hotels and newer apartments managed by 
the city. Once people saw their friends and neighbors move into better housing an arson 
epidemic sparked in the city, as did a string of riots: incendiary devices were utilized to 
burn automobiles and buildings alike. 
Arson can also be “extremist”-motivated, committed to further a social, political, 
or religious cause. The targeted property usually corresponds in some way to the 
offender’s belief system: laboratories, slaughterhouses, fur stores, abortion clinics, and 
religious institutions.32 Arson has also historically been used extensively by domestic 
terrorists groups like the Animal Liberation Front (ALF) and Earth Liberation Front 
(ELF). These groups are primarily concerned with attacking symbols of capitalism and 
exploitation: businesses they perceive to be engaged in animal abuse, habitat destruction, 
or environmental atrocities. In a joint special assessment on arson tactics, DHS confirmed 
that arson is the preferred method of attack for ALF and ELF, and that IIDs used in ALF 
and ELF attacks have unique signatures that tie the groups to these crimes.33 John E. 
Lewis, deputy assistant director of the FBI, in testimony to the U.S. Senate Committee on 
Judiciary stated that ALF and ELF extremists consistently use improvised incendiary 
devices equipped with crude but effective timing mechanisms to commit their acts of 
terrorism.34   
Propaganda found on the ALF websites, in particular the manual Arson Around 
with Auntie A.L.F: Your Guide for Putting Heat on Animal Abusers Everywhere, explains 
the advantages of using incendiary devices. The manual points out that a high-quality 




32 Sarah Kilpatrick, International Encyclopedia of Justice Studies, 
http://www.iejs.com/Law/Criminal_Law/arson.htm, [assessed September 30, 2005]. 
33 DHS, ATF, and FBI, Joint Special Assessment: Arson-Related Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 
of the Animal Liberation Front and Earth Liberation Front, U/FOUO (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department 
of Homeland Security, Sept 2005), 2. 
34 John E. Lewis, Deputy Asst Director, FBI, “Testimony to U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary,” 
May 18, 2004, http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=1196&wit_id=3460, [accessed November 7, 
2005]. 
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materials more easily obtained. It also provides basic rules of safety, tools and 
techniques, and instructions on preparing and igniting many different types of incendiary 
devices.35   
ALF and ELF activists have carried out numerous multimillion-dollar arson 
attacks: 
• Veterinary Medicine Research Building at the University of California-
Davis in April 1987, which resulted in an estimated $3.5 million in 
damages.   
• In August 1992, ALF extremists raided the campus of Michigan State 
University and set fire to an office, destroying files containing thirty-two 
years’ worth of toxicology and nutrition research.   
• ALF also claimed responsibility for the July 1997 arson of a horse-
rendering plant in Redmond, Oregon, which resulted in over $1 million in 
damage to the physical plant and imposed significant secondary costs 
resulting from the loss of revenue normally generated by the site.  
• In May 1998, ALF claimed responsibility for an attack on a processing 
plant owned by Florida Veal Processors, Inc., in Wimauma, Florida which 
caused about $500,000 in damage.36   
Despite having caused millions of dollars of damage and economic loss, ALF’s goal - 
unlike other terrorist groups - is not to kill or terrorize the public.  
Pyro-terrorism, a term devised by Lt. Col. Robert Baird of the U.S. Marine 
Corps, differentiates “simple” arson from terrorism. Using the FBI definition of 
terrorism, Baird substitutes “the unlawful use of force and violence” with “the use of 
incendiary attacks” to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any 
segment thereof, to advance political or social objectives.37 Pyro-terrorism possesses all 
the elements of terrorism: targeting of noncombatants; political motivation; violence with 
 
35 ALF/ELF, Arson Around with Auntie A.L.F: Your Guide for Putting the Heat on Animal Abusers 
Everywhere, http://www.thedisease.net/arcana/explosives/Arson_Around.pdf, [accessed August 3, 2006].  
36 U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, FBI Publication #0308, “Terrorism 
2000-2001,” 35, http://www.fbi.gov/publications/terror/terror2000_2001.htm#page35, [accessed 6 January 
2006]. 
37 Robert A. Baird, “Pyro-Terrorism: The Threat of Arson-Induced Forest Fires as a Future Terrorist 
Weapon of Mass Destruction,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 29 (2006): 415. 
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a psychological impact; and organized perpetrators. Baird points out that it is indeed the 
political and psychological effect that differentiates Pyro-terrorism from arson.38
Incendiary devices are easily improvised and are inexpensive to produce. The 
materials to construct an IID are readily available from any hardware or grocery store, 
and are unlikely to invite suspicion from store employees. There are many advantages to 
using IIDs as terrorist weapons: they require little training to prepare and use. Overall, 
flammable materials are not as volatile as explosives; a person using these materials 
therefore does not require the same level of knowledge and experience as someone 
handling explosives. Properly used and strategically placed, firebombs have the potential 
to kill more people and cause greater property damage than a similarly-sized explosive 
device. Arson also provides a greater opportunity for evidence to be destroyed in the fire, 
and presents excellent opportunities for terrorists to draw attention to their cause.  
The mission of fire departments across the country is to protect the life and 
property of citizens from the ravages of fire. These front-line battles in “the war that 
never ends” have taken their toll on both firefighters and civilians. The addition of a 
terrorism component and the use of IIDs will undoubtedly take an even greater toll.  
Many of the buildings in NYC and across the nation were built more than a hundred 
years ago. A building, like a person, has a life span of seventy-five to hundred years; 
beyond this age a structure becomes badly deteriorated as wood shrinks and rots, mortar 
loses its adhesive qualities, and steel rusts and weakens.39 Unless these buildings are 
rehabilitated or renovated, a fire will rapidly destroy the already-weakened structural 
elements of the building and cause swift collapse. Lightweight building materials used in 
new construction throughout the nation also increase the possibility of early collapse 
during a fire. These factors, in conjunction with the possibility of IID use, place at higher 
risk the citizens living and working in these buildings along with the firefighters who 
respond to protect them.   
 
38 Robert A. Baird, “Pyro-Terrorism: The Threat of Arson-Induced Forest Fires as a Future Terrorist 
Weapon of Mass Destruction,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 29 (2006): 415. 
39 Vincent Dunn, Collapse of Burning Buildings: A Guide to Fireground Safety (New York:  
PennWell Publishing, 1988), 2.  
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2. Hazardous Material Trucking Industry 
After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, intelligence agencies warned that the U.S.’s vast 
fleet of trucks, particularly those hauling loads of explosive fuel or toxic chemicals, 
would be ideal terrorist weapons. To date, little has been done to address this threat. 
Many companies are now developing or adopting satellite navigation and location 
technologies that rely on the Department of Defense’s GPS (Global Positioning System) 
satellites in order to track shipments. The Automatic Vehicle Location (AVL) system is a 
popular satellite system used by the trucking industry, though there are a number of union 
concerns and privacy issues associated with it.40   
Terrorists have frequently used vehicles to transport explosives in order to destroy 
a target. They are acutely aware that tanker trucks full of flammable and combustible fuel 
constitute convenient weapons or surrogate bombs. These tanker trucks can be used 
against specific targets, even turning hazardous industrial factories or plants into 
chemical weapons. Saul Wilen, in “Countering Terrorist Threats,” cites numerous attacks 
internationally involving trucks that caused massive devastation and death.41 This shift in 
terrorist behavior signals a new tactic and must heighten awareness among security 
specialists to the increased risk potential for the trucking industry. 
This nation's hazardous cargo offers the same opportunity that airliners provided 
on 9/11: the chance to transform hazardous materials vehicles into mobile weapons of 
war. Thousands of trips are made each day by gasoline tankers, many of which hold as 
much fuel as a Boeing 757. The establishment of the Transportation Security 
Administration (TSA) ensured stricter security controls on the aviation industry, but the 
increased security of the airline industry has shifted the vulnerability to the trucking 
industry. America’s trucks now bear an even greater risk than before 9/11.42
 
 
40 Daniel R. Sovocol, “GPS: Charting New Terrain – Legal Issues Related to GPS-Based Navigation 
and Location Systems,” Construction Weblinks, April 1999, 
http://www.constructionweblinks.com/Resources/Industry_Reports_Newsletters/April1999/april_1999.htm
l, [accessed August 2, 2006]. 
41 Sovocol, “GPS: Charting New Terrain.”  
42 Dr. Saul B. Wilen, “Countering Terrorism Threats: Trucking Industry and Multi-Modal Distribution 
Network Vulnerabilities,” International Horizons Unlimited, Ltd, February 10, 2003, 
http://www.intlhorizons.com/article-trucking.htm, [accessed December 30, 2005]. 
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3. World Trade Center IID Attack 
After the September 11, 2001 IID attacks on the World Trade Center (WTC), the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the Structural Engineering 
Institute of the American Society of Civil Engineers (SEI/ASCE) deployed a team of 
civil, structural, and fire protection engineers to study building performance at the WTC 
site. This Building Performance Study (BPS) team made the following observations and 
findings: 
The large quantity of jet fuel carried by each aircraft ignited upon impact 
into each building. A significant portion of this fuel was consumed 
immediately in the ensuing fireballs. The remaining fuel is believed either 
to have flowed down through the buildings or to have burned off within a 
few minutes of the aircraft impact. The heat produced by this burning jet 
fuel does not by itself appear to have been sufficient to initiate the 
structural collapses. However, as the burning jet fuel spread across several 
floors of the building, it ignited much of the buildings’ contents, causing 
simultaneous fires across several floors of both buildings. The heat output 
from these fires is estimated to have been comparable to the power 
produced by a large commercial power generating station. Over a period 
of many minutes, this heat induced additional stresses into the damaged 
structural frames while simultaneously softening and weakening these 
frames. This additional loading and the resulting damage were sufficient 
to induce the collapse of both structures.43
The FEMA study concludes it was the fire that ultimately caused the collapse of the 
WTC towers.   
Baird makes an insightful observation in modeling future terrorist behavior. He 
contends that future pyro-terrorist attacks will lean toward unrestrained violence for 
maximum psychological impact and challenge the conventional definitions of “attack” 
and “weapon,” which cause destruction by releasing a catalyst in the target to release 
stored energy in a destructive way.44  The attack on the World Trade Center did just that. 
Instead of planting conventional explosives as in 1993, on 9/11 al Qaeda used jet fuel as a 
catalyst to create fires. The latent energy stored in the combustible components of the 
Twin Towers was released by the chemical action of fire. It was the World Trade 
 
43 FEMA, “World Trade Center Building Performance Study,” Executive Summary, 2, 
http://www.fema.gov/library/wtcstudy.shtm, [accessed 30 October 2005]. 
44 Baird, “Pyro-Terrorism,” 418. 
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Center’s own destructive energy that led to the towers destroying themselves.45 The 
enormous fire that developed weakened the steel support structure at its critical 
vulnerability, causing the WTC Towers to collapse under their own weight. 
4. Wildland and Wildland-Urban Interface (WUI) 
Generally, wildland fires, especially in the Western United States, burn in areas of 
low or nonexistent human habitation, with minimal impacts on social or economic 
systems. The advent of wildland-urban interface poses a greater threat to human 
populations (growing especially in the west) and infrastructure. The frequency and 
magnitude of wildfires has increased because of significant fuel buildups and extreme 
drought to the extent that wildfires now cause significant damage and disruption.  
Wildland fires are an increasing natural hazard in most regions of the United 
States, posing a threat to life and property particularly where native ecosystems meet 
developed areas.46 Wildland fires are also a natural process and often beneficial to 
ecosystem balance; their suppression is now recognized as having created a greater fire 
hazard as live and dead vegetation accumulates in areas where natural fires would have 
burned and removed these hazards.47 Thus, when fire is unnaturally suppressed in a fire-
dependent ecosystem, the native species that need fire die out and ground litter becomes 
excessive, creating an extreme fire hazard. When fire finally strikes, the results are even 
more destructive than otherwise would have been the case.   
As recently as July 2006, Newsday reported that Assem Hammoud, arrested in 
Lebanon for plotting to bomb New York’s PATH trains, had also considered setting a 
huge fire in the forests of California.48 In June of 2004 the FBI warned of a possible al 
Qaeda plot to set wildland fires in Colorado, Montana, Utah, and Wyoming.49 Terrorist 
groups can easily ignite immense wildland fires that would have a significant impact on 
the nation’s social and economic disposition.   
 
45 Baird, “Pyro-Terrorism,” 418. 
46 United States Geological Survey (USGS), “Wildfire Hazards-A National Threat,” Fact Sheet 2006-
3015, February 2006, http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2006/3015/2006-3015.pdf, [accessed July 14, 2006]. 
47 United States Geological Survey (USGS), “USGS Wildland Fire Research,” Fact Sheet 125-98, 
October 1998, http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/1998/125-98/1998-125-98.pdf, [accessed June 30, 2006]. 
48 Mohamad Bazzi, “Terror Suspects Plotted Against Brooklyn Bridge, Other Landmarks, Officials 
Say,” Newsday, July 9, 2006.   
49 Baird, “Pyro-Terrorism,” 417. 
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C. INCENDIARY DEVICES  
As the name implies, the principal purpose of all incendiary devices is to start 
fires; depending on their action on detonation, they are classified as either scatter type or 
intensive type.50 Upon bursting, the scatter-type bomb disperses its incendiary contents 
over a wide area with the intention of starting a number of simultaneous fires among 
easily ignitable materials. In contrast, an intensive-type bomb burns fiercely in one 
concentrated mass at the point where it detonates.  
There are scores of flammable chemicals and materials that can be used to 
manufacture IIDs. An ideal incendiary weapon, as defined by scientists and engineers 
during World War II, should have the following characteristics: burn persistently for an 
appreciable length of time with a very high temperature; burn vigorously and not be 
easily extinguished; be able to distribute itself over a fairly large area; and be safe to 
handle. Incendiary devices require a detonator or igniter to assure positive ignition, 
should be stable enough not to ignite by shock or bullets, and they should not deteriorate 
in storage.51
The chief commercial and military incendiary agents used to manufacture 
incendiary devices are thermite (TH), magnesium (MG), white phosphorus (WP), 
combustible hydrocarbons, and napalm (MK 77).52 Their basic properties and usage 
combinations are:   
• Metal incendiaries burn metal. Magnesium is the most common pure 
metal incendiary agent; it has the advantage of a very high burning 
temperature. 
• Pyrotechnic incendiary agents incorporate an oxidizing agent to ensure 
initial combustion independent of air supply. Thermite is a mixture of 
ferric oxide and aluminum that generates high temperatures sufficient to 
melt iron or steel. 
• Oil-based incendiary agents burn liquid fuel. Napalm petroleum thickened 
with rubber is a very effective fire starter.  
 
50 With New York Firefighters (WNYF), “Defense School, Lessons Learned from the Battle of Britain 
applied to New York’s Emergency Preparations,” WNYF l3 (1941): 5. 
51 John W. Mountcastle, Flame On! (Pennsylvania:  White Mane Books, 1999), x. 
52 Army Field Manual, “Incendiary Agents,” FM 8-285/NAVMED P-5041/AFJMAN 44-149/FMFM 
11-11, http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/policy/army/fm/80285/ch9pdf. [accessed July 28, 2006]. 
Federation of American Scientists, FAS, “MK77 750lb: Napalm,” http://www.fas.org/man/dod-
101/sys/dumb/mk77.htm, [accessed July 28, 2006]. 
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• Oil-and-metal incendiaries use oil incendiaries for spreading effect and the 
metal incendiaries are added to increase heat. Pyrogels consist of 
thickened gasoline and metal incendiary and have extremely high 
temperatures. 
• Pyrophoric incendiary weapons are capable of igniting spontaneously in 
the air without an ignition device. White Phosphorus forms a dense, white 
cloud of smoke and has a relatively low combustion point. 
• Inorganic substances that ignite in water: Sodium is a very reactive 
substance – common as a compound but never found free in nature – that 
spontaneously ignites when it contacts water. It is sometimes used as an 
additive to napalm.53 
Other than WP, these weapons require only a small amount of explosive material to 
ignite. Upon ignition, a raging fire develops and burns at such extreme temperatures that 
it could destroy most buildings. 
Step-by-step instructions on how to manufacture IIDs and the ignition devices are 
available on the internet. All the materials can be purchased at a local hardware store or 
gas station.  The simplest incendiaries are flammable and combustible fuels like gasoline 
and diesel fuel, but include others:   
• Home-Made Napalm – Shaved or chipped bar soap with a liquid 
hydrocarbon fuel (gasoline, fuel oil, diesel oil, kerosene, turpentine, 
benzene or toluene), mixed together in a double boiler. 
• Paraffin-Sawdust Incendiary – Sawdust and melted paraffin mixed and 
poured into a waxed paper carton. This mixture is almost as effective as 
napalm. 
• Sawdust, Moth Flakes, and Oil Incendiary – Sawdust, moth flakes 
(naphthalene), fuel oil (kerosene or diesel oil). Mixed in equal parts and 
stirred until the mixture is the consistency of mush; stored in any container 
that will retain the oil fumes. 
• Incendiary Brick – Composed of potassium chlorate, sulphur, sugar, iron 
filings and wax. When properly made, it looks like an ordinary building 
brick and can be easily transported without detection. 
• Thermate Incendiary – Similar to commercial thermite, except it also 
contains an oxidizer, making it easier to ignite. Composed of aluminum or 
magnesium filings plus potassium nitrate, sodium nitrate, barium nitrate, 
 
53 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRP), Incendiary Weapons (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts:  MIT Press, 1975), 88-103. 
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potassium dichromate, sodium dichromate, or potassium permanganate. 
Thermate made from magnesium is easier to ignite.54 
These simple, homemade incendiary devices demonstrate the vulnerability of the U.S. to 
IIDs; that the recipe for manufacturing them is available on the internet makes the threat 













54 ALF/ELF, “Arson Around with Auntie A.L.F,” 
http://www.thedisease.net/arcana/explosives/Arson_Around.pdf, [accessed August 3, 2006].  
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III. THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN IID ATTACK 
This chapter will demonstrate the possible consequences of an IID terrorist attack. 
Specifically, it will discuss the destructive fires that can develop in a wildland setting as 
well as in an urban environment. Large area fires, firestorms and conflagrations will be 
defined and differentiated, along with their mechanisms of ignition and fire behavior. An 
overview will be provided of the devastating effects that IIDs and their consequent fires 
have on the public, critical infrastructure, key resources, and first responders. Finally, we 
will address the terrorist’s ultimate goal: the catastrophic consequences – both physical 
and psychological – of these horrifying fires.  
A. FIRESTORMS AND CONFLAGRATIONS 
All catastrophic fires, whether urban or wildland, involve large burning areas with 
abundant and continuous fuel sources. Most of the literature on large fires classifies these 
types of fires as firestorms or conflagrations; the two modes have distinct characteristics 
and important consequences with regard to the damage produced.55   
The transition of a large fire into a conflagration results from the interaction of a 
single fire, its fuel, and the surrounding air mass.56 A conflagration can be driven by high 
winds and spawn localized fire whirls.57 Conversely, a firestorm begins with the 
simultaneous ignition of many fires in a particular area that burn as autonomous 
entities.58 Firestorms are characterized by an inrushing fire wind of hurricane force, 
producing a rotating rising column of highly heated gases. The resulting fire is a 
synergistic phenomenon of extreme burning that responds to its own internal energy 
dynamics. A firestorm may be an extreme event but is a likely possibility if many fires 
are simultaneous ignited in a highly combustible area.  
 
55 R.D. Small and H.L. Brode, Physics of Large Urban Fires, PSR Report 1010 (Santa Monica, CA: 
Pacific-Sierra Research Corporation, March 1980), 16.  
56 Stephen J. Pyne, Fire in America: A Cultural History of Wildland and Rural Fire (Princeton, New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1982), 24. 
57 James G. Quintiere, “Canadian Mass Fire Experiment,” Journal of Fire Protection Engineering 5, 
no. 2 (1993): 68. 
58 Pyne, Fire in America, 24.  
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The properties of firestorms and their relation to area ignition were first 
recognized as a result of the firebombings of World War II. This fire phenomenon has 
been intensively researched in view of the fact that in the event of nuclear war, firestorms 
would dominate the landscape. During World War II, firestorms were created by British 
and American conventional incendiary weapons and by U.S. atomic bombs. The 
consequent firestorms from these weapons destroyed a number of cities, most notably 
Hamburg and Dresden, Tokyo, Hiroshima, and Nagasaki.59   
Theodore A. Postol, a renowned physicist and nuclear engineer from the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), describes firestorms as:   
Numerous near-simultaneous ignitions that cause a significant heating of 
air, which rises and pumps large masses of cooler air out and down. This 
cooler air is then drawn at high speeds into the fire zone at ground level. 
Mass Fires (firestorms) thus generate significant winds that spread the fire 
violently inward... The vacuum created by buoyantly rising air follows 
from the basic physics of combustion and fluid flow. As the area of the 
fire increases, so does the volume of rising air over the fire zone, causing 
even more air to be sucked in from the periphery of the fire at increasingly 
higher speeds. 60    
Firestorms exhibit traits not observed in such smaller-scale fires as those in 
isolated buildings, most wildland fires, and conflagrations burning on a front. In 
firestorms an atmospheric disturbance takes place that results in a recirculation of air 
flow into the flaming area.61 This causes inward-rushing hurricane force winds to 
develop on the perimeter of the fire, drawing the cooler air into the fire area. Firestorms 
are predominantly stationary, are independent of atmospheric wind conditions, and 
spread by themselves rather than by wind.  
In contrast, conflagrations are large, uncontrolled fires that may be started by a 
single ignition or a few ignitions and spread along a front. Conflagrations, unlike 
firestorms, continue to respond to the fire environment and the weather. The great urban 
fires in London, Chicago, and San Francisco are considered conflagrations.62 
 
59 Eden, Whole World on Fire, 28. 
60 Ibid, 156, 27. 
61 Small and Brode, “Physics of Large Urban Fires,” executive summary.  
62 Ibid, 159. 
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Conflagrations have extreme energy releases and are stopped only by dramatic changes in 
the fire environment, including different or depleted fuels or the onset of rain. These large 
fires may release the energy equivalent of a Hiroshima-type atomic bomb exploding 
every five to fifteen minutes.63 The advancement and destructive features of the 
conflagration can be much greater than those of a firestorm; the conflagration fire 
continues to spread until there is no longer combustible material to burn and the fire runs 
out of fuel. In a firestorm, the area of fire spread is less significant and nearly uniform in 
all directions around its perimeter.64 The inward-rushing air in a firestorm is the decisive 
factor in limiting the spread of fire beyond the initial ignited area. Firestorms, though, 
will cause almost total destruction within the burning area.  
In the past, conflagration and firestorm disasters have occurred in urban, wildland 
and wildland-urban interface (WUI) settings from natural and military measures. In the 
future, terrorist groups using asymmetric methods and employing IIDs have the ability to 
create these large, destructive fires. Both conflagrations and firestorms are terrifying and 
extremely lethal.  
The potentially destructive forces inherent in conventional facilities and nuclear 
power plants provide a strong foundation for terrorist groups to create fires aimed at these 
critical nodes of our infrastructure. Fire damage would trigger uncontrolled and wide-
scale destructive events. The extreme temperatures produced by conflagrations or 
firestorms could affect the structural components of a nuclear power plant, resulting in a 
leak of radioactive material. Such an event would take a tremendous toll on human and 
other resources. Local, state and federal assets would be severely depleted in the 
mitigation of the fires and from released hazardous materials. The key resources from 
power plants and production facilities would be interrupted and could create a nationwide 
power shortage.   
In the past decade, especially in the western part of the United States, large and 
severe wildland fires have occurred regularly.  In cities throughout the country, large fires 
are a perpetual threat. Currently, firefighters cannot meet the challenge of a large-scale 
 
63 Pyne, Fire in America, 24. 
64 Eden, Whole World on Fire, 91. 
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urban or wildland fire of the magnitude of a conflagration or firestorm. Neither 
equipment nor training nor manpower is adequate to cope with such an event.65  
1. Wildland / Wildland-Urban Interface Fires 
Wildland and wildland-urban interface fires have a significant impact on the 
social and economic systems of city, county, and state. The immediate consequences are 
easy to anticipate:  
• Forest destruction and destruction of homes and businesses  
• Fire suppression costs. Since 2000, federal costs have averaged more than 
$1 billion annually66 
• Erosion 
• Landslides 
• Introduction of invasive species 
• The destruction of numerous critical infrastructures and key resources:  
• Entire Communities 
• Telecommunications towers   
• Gas transmission lines  
• Electrical substations and power lines 
• Nuclear power plants 
• Domestic livestock   
• Timber resources  
• Road and Rail systems   
• Pollution of watersheds and reservoirs. 
Long-term impacts include:  
• Reduced property values and property tax revenues 
• Lost sales tax and business revenues from reduced tourism 
• Health problems and the ensuing medical expenses from smoke and other 
toxic gases  
• Lost productivity by those evacuated and by firefighters performing 
suppression activities  
 
65 Small and Brode, “Physics of Large Urban Fires,” 42.  
66 Robert A. Robinson, “Wildland Fire Suppression – Better Guidance Needed to Clarify Sharing of 
Costs between Federal and Nonfederal Entities,” GAO Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Public 
Lands and Forest, Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, U.S. Senate, June 21, 2006, 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06896t.pdf, [August 6, 2006]. 
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• Poor water quality from watersheds and reservoirs resulting in increased 
water treatment costs. 
Non-market costs include aesthetic and habitat damage, reduced or lost recreation use, 
and reduced access to the area.  
The post-fire effects of wildland fires pose a double hazard. First, the fire burns 
away all vegetation, causing rains following the fire on a mountain slope to trigger 
landslides of mud, rock and other debris. The organic material in the soil may also burn 
away or become transformed into water-repellent substances that prevent water soil 
infiltration. Even normal rainfall can result in substantial erosion or flooding from a 
burned area.67 Second, water supplies are affected by fire. The loss of ground-surface 
cover such as needles and small branches and the chemical transformation of burned soils 
make watersheds more susceptible to erosion from rainstorms since the kinetic energy 
from each raindrop causes a continuous process of erosion during a rainfall event. 
Furthermore, floating burned debris in reservoirs causes deterioration of water quality.68    
Fire studies reveal a decline of cyclical wildland fires during the past century due 
to timber harvesting, agriculture, roads, fire suppression, and lack of deliberate controlled 
burning as was practiced in the past. All these factors increase the vulnerability to a 
terrorist attack employing IIDs. Terrorist groups have the ability to create large fires in 
wildland and wildland-urban interface environments. Much of the U.S. is already 
susceptible to wildland fires, particularly during summer drought periods that occur with 
ever-greater frequency in the western U.S. (Appendix A contains a map showing 
locations that experienced wildland fires greater than 250 acres, from 1980 to 2003.)  
Once terrorist groups begin using IIDs as a weapon, the consequences of these fires will 
increase exponentially.  
With little planning, terrorist groups can create large fires in wildland and WUI 
conducive to fire extension or containing critical infrastructure. Large fires ignited in the 
path of critical infrastructures like nuclear power plants or near key resources such as 
reservoirs will create a greater hazard than the fire itself. In the 2000 fire season, two 
 
67United States Geological Survey (USGS), “USGS Wildland Fire Research,” USGS Fact Sheet 125-
98, October 1998 http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/1998/125-98/1998-125-98.pdf, [accessed June 30, 2006]. 
68 Ibid. 
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nuclear power facilities were threatened by wildland fires in less than two months. First, 
in mid-May, the Cerro Grande fire severely threatened the Los Alamos National 
Laboratory in New Mexico. Then in June, another fast-moving range fire swept through 
the Hanford Nuclear Site in Washington.69 Luckily, because of the wind direction none 
of the buildings housing radioactive or chemical materials was burned. On the other 
hand, under more favorable meteorological conditions a terrorist group could ignite a 
wildland fire in the path of these facilities. Damage from the extreme heat of these fires 
could cause a release of radioactive material into the environment.   
Erosion on reservoirs and ecosystems after a wildland fire can be enormously 
destructive. As much as 100 times more erosion can occur after fires, causing damaging 
floods and choking freshwater ecosystems and hydroelectric power generators with 
sediment and debris.70 The increased sediment in the reservoirs alters the smell and taste 
of the water, making more frequent charcoal flushing necessary. An increase in sediments 
like clay and silt in streams and reservoirs can significantly alter natural ecosystems by 
killing fish and vegetation. Flooding and debris slides on steep mountain slopes are 
dangerous consequences of wildland fires: fire changes the chemistry of soil, making it 
more water repellant.71  In burned areas, the chance of flooding increases with erosion 
because there is no vegetation to protect the soil and slow the overland flow of water 
from hill slopes to streams.  
The Earth Resources Observation and Science (EROS) Data Center of the U.S. 
Geological Survey (USGS) produces bi-weekly “Greenness Maps” for the forty-eight 
contiguous states and Alaska. These satellite maps provide comprehensive growing 
season profiles for forests, rangelands, grasslands, and agricultural areas, and are used by 
land managers to plan for fire suppression and schedule prescribed burns.72 The USFS 
 
69 Keith Easthouse, “Nuclear complex: Too close for comfort,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 56, 
no. 5 (September/October 2000), 10, http://www.thebulletin.org/article.php?art_ofn=so00easthouse, 
[accessed August 7, 2006]. 
70 Colorado University Researcher, “Wildfire Erosion Effects Will Show up in Reservoirs, 
Ecosystems,” July 15, 2002, 1, http://www.colorado.edu/news/releases/2002/330.html, [accessed August 8, 
2006]. 
71 Ibid., 2. 
72 United States Geological Survey (USGS), “USGS Wildland Fire Research,” USGS Fact Sheet 125-
98, October 1998, http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/1998/125-98/1998-125-98.pdf, [accessed June 30, 2006]. 
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uses Greenness Maps to generate national maps of selected fire-weather and fire-danger 
components of its Wildland Fire Assessment System.73 Additionally, the Fire Potential 
Index (FPI) characterizes relative fire potential in these same areas. This information is 
easily accessible on the internet; terrorist groups can use it to their advantage to employ 
IIDs to create destructive wildland fires that could extend into WUI, rural, suburban and 
eventually into urban areas.   
Terrorists can initiate fires and modify fire behavior by deliberately altering 
wildland fuels and creating unique ignition patterns. This may magnify burning 
intensities of fires that can develop into firestorms when natural conditions might not 
have allowed for the transition.74  Approximately 50,000 fires occur each year, ranging 
from large area brush fires to extensive wildland fires.75 As terrorist groups begin 
igniting multiple fires throughout our forests, resources would be severely depleted.  
There are seven Regional Geographic Area Coordination Centers (GACC) directing only 
seventeen National Type I Incident Management Teams (IMTs).76 These Type I IMTs 
manage the mitigation of wildland fires throughout the country. Multiple wildland and 
WUI fires would quickly overwhelm IMTs.  
2. Urban Fires 
During World War II, urban firestorms destroyed many cities in Germany and 
Japan. The firestorm created in Hamburg, Germany, was reported to have produced 
hurricane force winds and air temperatures over 4000 F. Within three to six hours more 
than five square miles of the city were completely burned and approximately 60,000-
70,000 people died as a result of the firestorms.77   
Other than wartime firestorms, natural disasters have produced conflagrations in a 
number of urban environments. Some of the most notable city fires include the Great Fire  
73 United States Geological Survey (USGS), “USGS Wildland Fire Research,” USGS Fact Sheet 125-
98, October 1998, http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/1998/125-98/1998-125-98.pdf, [accessed June 30, 2006]. 
74 Pyne, Fire in America, 28. 
75 National Fire News, Daily Statistics, 2, http://www.nifc.gov/fireinfo/nfn.html, [accessed August 7, 
2006]. 
76 “National Type I Interagency Incident Management Teams and Regional GACCs,” 
http://www.wildlandfire.com/docs/IIMT.htm, [accessed August 8, 2006]. 
77 Theodore A. Postol, Possible Fatalities from Superfires Following Nuclear Attacks in or near 
Urban Areas, National Academy of Sciences Institute of Medicine (Washington, D.C.: National Academy 
Press, 1986), 52-53. 
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of London in 1666, the Chicago Fire in 1871, the San Francisco earthquake and fire in 
1906, and the Tokyo and Yokohama earthquake and fire in 1923.  These large urban fires 
are fraught with dangers and complications.  
After an IID attack, when numerous fires are burning simultaneously throughout a 
city, firefighting resources would quickly become taxed and limited. Limited resources 
and the combination of intense radiant and convection heat energy generated by these 
large fires would prevent firefighting forces from getting close enough to extinguish 
them. The fires would likely expand and ignite adjoining structures. As additional 
structures became involved, conflagrations or even firestorms could develop and engulf 
an entire section of a city in flames.   
Buildings are designed and constructed according to Building and Fire Codes to 
confine and control a fire, to allow building occupants time to evacuate, to allow fire 
department personnel time to access and gain control over the fire, and to accommodate 
expected fire loads of the building. Large, expanding fires can countermand the design 
and construction features in these buildings. Structural fires have three identifiable stages: 
growth stage, fully developed stage, and decay stage. The second and third stages of fire 
growth are when a building’s structural framework is often affected and when most 
burning building collapses occur.78   
Vertical development in crowded cities poses unique dangers during fires. High-
rise buildings are common in cities throughout the country, containing thousands of 
occupants, many on the upper floors who are beyond the reach of fire department ladders. 
A modern high-rise building’s primary component is a central core containing the 
building’s services and facilities such as power and water lines, elevators, air supply and 
return shafts, enclosed stairs and restrooms. The core is connected to columns in the 
exterior walls of the building by steel girders; this eliminates the need for intermediate 
columns and provides an unobstructed floor space.79 These modern, lightweight, high-
rise buildings are less fire resistant than the previous generation of high-rise construction. 
They have an open-floor design with a potential for larger fires, more and superior 
 
78 Vincent Dunn, Collapse of Burning Buildings (New York:  PenWell Publicaton, 1988), 264. 
79 John. T. O’Hagan, High Rise/Fire and Life Safety (New York:  Dun-Donnelley Publishing, 1977), 
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insulation that retains heat, and complex building systems in the core. The combination 
of factors increases the fire hazards of high-rise buildings.   
The World Trade Center collapse is a poignant example of how fire can cause 
modern high-rise buildings to crumble. The impact of the planes destroyed the sprinkler 
system and knocked off the fireproofing material on the structural steel. The lightweight 
truss beams supporting the concrete floor had very little inherent fire resistance, and as a 
result heated up rapidly and failed. A progressive mechanical collapse of all floors 
destroyed the building and killed most of the occupants. The National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (NIST) Building Performance Study of the World Trade 
Center Towers concluded that it was the fire rather than the impact of the planes that 
ultimately caused the collapse of the WTC Towers.80   
In contrast to this, when a ten-ton B-25 U.S. Army aircraft crashed into the 
Empire State Building on July 28, 1945, the building withstood both the crash and the 
ensuing fire. The Empire State Building was built of heavyweight construction, with all 
structural elements protected by brick and concrete. The plane crashed into the seventy-
eighth and seventy-ninth floors, spewing 800 gallons of gasoline that ignited and spread 
fire throughout a number of floors. The fire was extinguished within thirty-five minutes 
of the arrival of the fire department: this is a tribute not only to the FDNY’s efficiency, 
but also to the construction and design of the building.81
High-rise buildings require substantial resources to control a fire because 
occupants on the upper floors are easily trapped as high heat and smoke in the stairwells 
render the exits impassable. Sabotaged fire suppression systems will prevent firefighters 
from extinguishing the fires and reaching the trapped occupants. Multiple, simultaneous 
high-rise fires would rapidly deplete municipal fire department resources; without 
sufficient resources, high-rise buildings burn until all fuel is exhausted or until the 
building collapses.  
Modern-day cities contain more plastics and hydrocarbon fuels than ever before. 
Once ignited, these fuels burn extremely hot and produce more dense black smoke than a  
80 FEMA, “World Trade Center Building Performance Study,” Executive Summary, 2, 
http://www.fema.gov/library/wtcstudy.shtm, [accessed 30 October 2005].  
81 O’Hagan, High Rise/Fire and Life Safety, 21. 
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wood-based fire load. As a precursor to an IID attack in a city, a terrorist group could 
easily sabotage as many fire protection systems as possible. With fire protection systems 
inoperable the simultaneous ignition of multiple IIDs in strategic locations would trigger 
large, expanding fires and potentially create the same type of firestorms that Germany 
and Japan experienced during World War II.   
B. PHYSIOLOGICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES OF FIRE 
The physiological and psychological consequences of fire are significant. Fire 
gases contain many toxins that can incapacitate a victim within minutes and the 
extremely high temperatures can cause severe skin and respiratory burns. A person 
subjected to the trauma of fire not only experiences physiological breakdown, but also is 
vulnerable to the development of psychological disorders.  
1. Physiological Effects of Fire 
A fire environment contains many hazards detrimental to the human body, 
including high ambient room temperatures, heat transfer to the body, smoke and toxic 
gases, and oxygen depletion.82 The body’s response to thermal injury is complex: burns 
severely affect a number of interrelated physiological systems, including the 
cardiovascular, pulmonary, renal, gastrointestinal, and immune systems.83 The burn 
damages the epidermis and creates an ideal environment for the growth of bacteria and 
infection. This, in conjunction with the suppression of the body’s immune system, is the 
reason infection is one of the leading causes of death in burn victims.84 Pain, both 
continuous background pain and the acute pain from therapeutic procedures, places 
additional stress on the body functions struggling for homeostasis. On the whole, burns 
are the most painful and physiologically damaging injuries a person can sustain. The 
human body is highly susceptible to burn injuries and has very little defense against 
them.   
 
82 Flannery Associates, “Human Behavior and Fire,” in Introduction to Fire Science (New York: 
CUNY John Jay College, January 2001), 
http://web.jjay.cuny.edu/~tflan/documents/101docs/FIS101OccupancyTypesandExits.pdf [accessed June 
19, 2006]. 
83 Baris Cakir and Berrak C. Yegen, “Perspectives in Medical Sciences: Systemic Responses to Burn 
Injury,” Turkish Journal of Medical Science 34 (May 2004): 215. 
84 Ibid. 
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Following a large-scale IID attack, hospitals would quickly become inundated 
with countless burn victims. The American Burn Association maintains a list of burn care 
facilities throughout the United States. Nationally, there are only 125 hospitals that 
operate burn care facilities, with a total of 1,817 burn beds.85 These numbers can be 
misleading: many facilities are typically already at capacity, substantially reducing the 
number of available burn beds. On average, most burn care hospitals have six to twelve 
burn beds; the largest, the William Randolph Hearst Burn Center in New York City, has 
forty. If a serious IID attack were to occur in the New York metropolitan area the 
maximum number of burn patients who could be treated at one time would be 133.86 This 
includes utilizing the burn beds from burn care facilities in New York, New Jersey and 
Connecticut, and assuming that all burn beds are available at the time of the event, which 
is highly unlikely. The graph below depicts the number burn care facilities and beds 
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Figure 2. Number of burn beds by region 
 
2. Psychological Effects of Fire 
Fire can have serious mental health consequences for its survivors. At large and 
growing fires, people do not have adequate time or warning to take protective measures, 
and the opportunity to escape is limited. Many people trapped by fire experience a sense 
of extreme fear, panic and a vivid confrontation with death.87 Acute stress-related 
symptoms, recurring flashbacks, nightmares and waves of fear often emerge shortly after 
a fire is contained. This is the period when some develop chronic psychological 
disorders, including post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).88   
                                                 
87 American Burn Association, Burn Care Facilities in the United States, 
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The fires that followed the 1906 San Francisco Earthquake are widely considered 
America’s worst urban disaster and one of the world’s greatest urban conflagrations.89  
These fires burned for three days and generated fire fronts with such intense radiant heat 
and toxic gases that many people died from asphyxiation and the inhalation of toxic gases 
even before the fire reached them. In a study conducted at the University of California at 
Berkeley thirteen years after the fire, students who were children at the time were asked 
to describe their feelings during the quake and subsequent fires. Some of the students said 
they were paralyzed with an indescribable fear at seeing the fire. Another student living 
outside the city feared the fire would sweep all through California. Many students stated 
that for years and years they had recurring memories of the devastation caused by the 
fires. There are hundreds of other stories illustrating the fear the earthquake and fire 
instilled in the people of San Francisco; the accounts clearly demonstrate the long-lasting 
psychological effects of this disaster.90 Even though the diagnosis of PTSD was not 
available in the early 1900s, we may presume many suffered from this disorder.  
People trapped by fire will take extreme measures to escape the flames. A fire in 
Peshtigo, Wisconsin that occurred on the same day as the Great Chicago fire in 1871 was 
the deadliest conflagration in U.S. history. There is an account of a man who slit the 
throats of all his children in order to spare them death by this horrifying fire.91 It is 
estimated that between 1,200 and 2,500 people perished in the Peshtigo fire. The Triangle 
Factory fire, which occurred in a sweatshop in New York City in 1911, is another 
example of the level of fear fire can inflict and the extreme measures people take to 
escape. This fire began on the eighth floor of a ten-story “fireproof” building. Within 
minutes, those on the ninth floor were trapped by smoke and flames coming up the 
stairwell. Realizing there was no other way to avoid the flames, some of the women 
broke out windows and jumped, while others pried open elevator doors and tumbled 
down the elevator shaft. Those remaining died as the smoke and fire overpowered them.  
 
89 Philip L. Fradkin, The Great Earthquake and Firestorms of 1906: How San Francisco Nearly 
Destroyed Itself (Berkeley and Los Angeles, California: University of California Press, 2005), 3. 
90 Philip L. Fradkin, The Great Earthquake and Firestorms of 1906: How San Francisco Nearly 
Destroyed Itself (Berkeley and Los Angeles, California: University of California Press, 2005), 3. 
91 Stephanie Hemphill, “Peshtigo: A Tornado of Fire Revisited,” Minnesota Public Radio, November 
27, 2002, http://new.minnesota.publicradio.org/features/200211/27_hemphills_peshigofire/ [accessed June 
4, 2006]. 
A total of 146 people were killed in the Triangle Factory fire, fifty-four of them as a 
result of jumping or falling.92  Many bystanders, policemen and firemen that day were 
horrified as young women leaped to their deaths to escape the flames.  
The fires that developed as a result of the terrorist attacks on the World Trade 
Center on 9/11 trapped hundreds of innocent people on the upper floors of the towers.  
The fear and horror experienced by those trapped in the North Tower were evident as 
they broke windows for air in order to breathe. Faced with insufferable heat, smoke, and 
fire, along with no hope for relief, an estimated 200 people either jumped or fell trying to 
escape.93 Most witnesses say those jumping appeared to make a conscious choice to die 
by falling; the fear of dying by fire was so great that ultimately they were choosing not 
whether to die but how. Figure 3 is a powerful illustration of the helplessness and fear 
being trapped by fire can create: it graphically depicts the desperation these people were 
subjected to. Many of the people in this photograph either fell or jumped to their death.    
 
 
Figure 3.  Trapped Occupants in the World Trade Center  
(AP Photo/Amy Sancetta) 
  
                                                 
92 Cornell University ILR School, “The Triangle Factory Fire,” March 25, 1911, 
http://www.ilr.cornell.edu/trianglefire/, [accessed June 11, 2006].  
93 USA Today, “Desperation forced a horrific decision,” USATODAY.com, Sept 9, 2002, 
http://www.usatoday.com/news/sept11/2002-09-02-jumperx.htm, [accessed June 1, 2006]. 
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Although IIDs have the potential to create conflagrations and firestorms, these 
large fires are not necessary to create fear and panic in the public. All fires can be deadly, 
especially those that occur in crowded theaters or nightclubs – transient occupancies 
assembling large numbers of people, many of whom are unaware of the layout or the 
location of exits. The After-Action Report of the Rhode Island Station nightclub fire in 
February 2003 powerfully describes what the victims of this fire must have experienced:  
It is difficult to conceive of a more terrifying and helpless situation than 
imminent death by fire without hope of escape – the smoky darkness, the 
toxic fumes and superheated air, the uncontrollable advance of all-
consuming flames, and the press of the bodies of other terrified, screaming 
persons. 94  
Tragic fires in nightclubs and theaters have occurred many times in the past 
hundred years. In 1903, the Iroquois Theater fire in Chicago, the deadliest nightclub fire 
in U.S. history, claimed the lives of 602 people. The Rhythm nightclub fire killed 209 
people in Mississippi in 1940, and the 1942 Cocoanut Grove fire in Boston killed 492 
people. These fires were accidents, but a simple IID containing only three-quarters of a 
gallon of gasoline killed eighty-seven people at the Happyland Social Club in New York 
City on March 25, 1990.95  
All forms of terrorism create fear, but the fear of burning to death is horrifying to 
all people. This fear is amplified by the randomness of an attack, the fact that people have 
no control over the situation and that no one knows where the next attack will occur. The 
use of weaponized fire by terrorist groups can only intensify this fear and anxiety.   
Terrorists do not need to use chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear or explosive 
(CBRNE) weapons to inflict mass casualties or cause extensive damage to critical 
infrastructure and key resources. IIDs can be used to serve the terrorist purpose by 
creating fires that generate fear and anxiety in communities throughout the country.  
Research on natural and human-caused disasters strongly suggests that the 
psychological reactions following human-caused disasters such as terrorism are more 
 
94 The Titan Corporation, “Rhode Island: The Station Club Fire After-Action Report,” Rhode Island 
Governor Donald L. Carcieri Website, http://www.governor.ri.gov/other/stationfirereport.php, [accessed 
June 7, 2006]. 
95 Richard W. Bukowski and Robert C. Spetzler, “Analysis of the Happyland Social Club Fire with 
Hazard I,” Fire and Arson Investigator 42, no. 3 (March 1992): 36. 
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intense and more prolonged than psychological reactions following natural disasters. In a 
study on mental health consequences, Diane Myers of the Clara Barton Center for 
Domestic Preparedness proposes that in order to understand, prevent, and respond to 
terrorist events, we must understand the critical importance of their psychological 
impact.96 Myers lists certain characteristics of a terrorist event that magnify the 
psychological effect, including a lack of warning, lack of familiarity, an abrupt change in 
reality, serious threat to personal safety, the scope of destruction, exposure to gruesome 
and grotesque situations, the intentional human casualties, and the degree of 
uncertainty.97 A major attack with an IID incorporates all these elements; the fear and 
destruction resulting from a conflagration initiated by an incendiary attack will guarantee 
the terrorist’s goals to create fear and uncertainty in society are achieved.  
America’s HealthTogether (AHT), a national health and health-care policy 
organization surveyed health care professionals around the country to investigate the 
science of disaster mental health. The results of the survey made it clear that the mental 
health needs of Americans have increased post-9/11 (especially in the New York and 
Washington, D.C. areas).98 In the 2003 survey, seventy-eight percent of health care 
providers reported that patients have been displaying terrorism-related emotional distress 
since 9/11.99 As illustrated in the graph below, events like 9/11 engender severe and 




96 Diane Myers, “Weapons of Mass Destruction and Terrorism: Mental Health Consequences and 
Implications for Planning and Training,” Weapons of Mass Destruction/Terrorism Orientation Pilot 
Program (Pine Bluff Arkansas: Clara Barton Center for Domestic Preparedness, August 15, 2001), 
http://www.icisf.org/articles/Acrobat%20Documents/TerrorismIncident/WMDMyers.html, [accessed 1 
November 2005].   
97 Ibid. 
98 Hahrie Han et al, America’s HealthTogether, “Facing Fear Together, Blueprint Report,” May 2003, 
http://www.healthtogether.org/healthtogether/facingFear/bluePrint.html. 16, [accessed 28 January 2006].  
99 Ibid. 
100 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Behavioral & Social Science Research, 
“Assessing the Effects of the Attacks on America,” October 15, 2002, 
http://obssr.od.nih.gov/activities/911/attack.htm. [accessed 28 January 2006] 
 
Figure 4. Percent of patients with psychological symptoms related to 9/11 
 
Unlike a natural disaster that victimizes a specific locality or region, a terrorist 
attack targets an entire society. The public is aware that everyone in the United States and 
abroad is a potential target for future attacks. It is the awareness of the persistent threat 
that distinguishes terrorism from natural disasters. The psychological strategy of 
terrorism is to ensure that no matter what defensive actions are taken, the next act of 
terror seems inevitable, likely to occur sooner rather than later, and threatens each and 
every individual.101
The psychological consequences of an IID attack killing hundreds or thousands of 
people and injuring many more with severe burns would be devastating. Survivors of 
physically disfiguring trauma, like burn injuries, experience a series of assaults on the 
mind and body that present extraordinary challenges to human resilience. In fact, twenty 
years ago it was generally accepted in the United States that persons with massive burns 
could not survive, or if they did, would be so unhappy they would want to die.102 
Survivors of burn injuries not only experience a terrifying psychological event from the 
fire, but also have to endure physical injuries that leave their bodies forever changed and 
disfigured. The physical changes in the victim’s body are a constant reminder of the fear, 
sadness and pain they have endured. But the agonizingly painful treatment of these burns  
                                                 
101 James N. Breckenridge and Philip G. Zimbardo, “The Strategy of Terrorism and the Psychology of 
Mass-Mediated Fear” (Lecture, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey California, Spring 2006). 
102 Patricia Blakeney and Daniel Creson, “Psychological and Physical Trauma: Treating the Whole 
Person,” Journal of Mine Action, James Madison University, Issue 6.3 (December 2002).  
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can also be just as traumatic. Besides the burns and treatment, the reactions of others to 
their changed physical condition present survivors with the additional trauma of feeling 
rejected, isolated, worthless and humiliated.  
Finally, an IID attack will have a substantial economic impact. The cost for burn 
care, long-term hospitalization and mental health care is extremely high; burns are one of 
the most expensive catastrophic injuries to treat. A burn of 30% of total body area can 
cost as much as $200,000 in initial hospitalization costs and physician fees.103  For many, 
long-term care and rehabilitation usually follows the initial burn treatment. One year in a 
nursing home can average more than $50,000.104 Generally, long-term care is not 
covered by health insurance – most people who need the care pay for it out of their own 
pockets. The addition of mental health care will increase the costs even more. If hundreds 
or thousands of people were injured in an IID attack, the costs would be astronomical, 
both to the affected individuals and their families, to insurance companies and health care 
providers and facilities, and to the government.  
 
103 Burn Survivor Resource Center, “Medical Care Guide, Burn Statistics,” 2, 
http://www.burnsurvivor.com/burn_statistics.html, [accessed August 8, 2006]. 
104 General Services Administration, “Guide to Long Term Care (LTC) Insurance,” 
http://www.pueblo.gsa.gov/cic_text/health/ltc/guide.htm#cost, [accessed August 8, 2006]. 
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IV. POLICY CHANGES 
A. OVERALL STRATEGY 
The homeland security community’s intense concentration on the threat posed by 
IEDs has caused it to overlook the use of IIDs as potentially devastating terrorist 
weapons. Such a preparedness oversight has created the kind of weakness that terrorists 
prey on. To reduce the threat of, and our vulnerability to, an IID attack the homeland 
security community and the public must be educated on the dangers posed by 
weaponized fire and turn their attention to preparing for and defending against IIDs. 
1. Purpose 
The purpose of this strategy is to create a greater awareness of the terrorist threat 
posed by IIDs and the United States’ vulnerability to the probable consequences so steps 
may be taken to ensure preparedness at all levels. The obvious destructive force of fire 
and its potential use as a terrorist weapon with the capability for mass casualties and 
destruction necessitates the classification of fire as a weapon of mass destruction. The 
U.S. Homeland Security community and first responders are not prepared for the tactical 
use of IIDs by terrorists. For one thing, the use of incendiary devices may not be 
immediately evident to the initial fire units responding. The key to identifying an IID 
attack is situational awareness; indications of an advanced fire on arrival, multiple 
ignition sources, and nearby fires will serve as signs of a possible IID attack.  
Providing awareness of the threat and vulnerability to, and also preparing for the 
consequences of conflagrations or firestorms will help to achieve the National 
Preparedness Goal.  The homeland security community needs to be well-informed in 
order to recognize the threat, prioritize it among other threats, take actions to prevent an 
attack using IIDs, and prepare a response to their use. This greater awareness will assist 
first responders in preparing their response operations and will assist law enforcement in 
preventing an IID incident by recognizing the possibility of flammable liquids and other 
materials as a possible terrorist threat.   
2. Vision  
The vision for this strategy is a national homeland security community that 
recognizes and is prepared for IID-Conflagration/Firestorm terrorist incidents, as 
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evidenced by full inclusion of the IID threat into the National Preparedness Goal. IIDs 
should be included with other weapons of mass destruction (chemical, biological, 
radiological, nuclear and explosives) and incorporated into the National Planning 
Scenarios. 
3. Focus 
Realizing the vision of preparedness for an IID-Conflagration/Firestorm incident 
requires a strong focus on three points: 
• Renewing research for the modeling of urban firestorms. Updated and 
expanded research would help local fire departments and all first 
responders prepare for their response to a conflagration or firestorm.  
• Classifying IIDs as weapons of mass destruction. DHS should change the 
threat classifications of the existing weapons of mass destruction matrix 
from CBRNE to CBIRNE. This change would then include fire and 
incendiary devices/weapons (IIDs) as an individual component of WMD. 
By including IIDs in the CBIRNE matrix, policy makers would thus 
ensure IIDs are recognized as a significant and unique threat to homeland 
security and defense.   
• Creating two new National Planning Scenarios: #16 IID – Urban 
Conflagration/Firestorm and #17 IID - Wildland-WUI 
Conflagration/Firestorm. Like the other scenarios, these fire scenarios will 
provide the foundation for identifying the capabilities across all mission 
areas and the target levels of those capabilities needed for effective 
prevention of, response to, and recovery from an IID attack and a 
conflagration or firestorm.  
4. Coordination and Effort  
In order for the homeland security community to change the status quo of the 
CBRNE threat and include IIDs in the matrix as a potential weapon of mass destruction it 
must overcome four organizational hurdles: cognitive recognition, limited resources, 
motivation and politics.105    
The first challenge is cognitive recognition. The most important stakeholders are 
citizens who will be innocent victims of an IID attack. In view of that, a change must be 
created in the public’s perception of the threat posed by IIDs. Most people are unaware of 
the potential danger lying in wait from an IID attack. Horrific deaths and the extensive 
property damage from accidental fires are in the public’s consciousness; a terrorist attack 
 
105 W. Chan Kim and Renee Mauborgne, Blue Ocean Strategy (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard 
Business School Publication Corp., 2005), 147-148. 
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using weaponized fire is still unfathomable. By raising awareness of the potential 
dangers, citizens of this nation can rally their community leaders to work with local, state 
and federal officials, insurance companies, and private-sector stakeholders to respond to 
the threat.   
The second challenge is one of limited resources: the homeland security 
community must know that extensive additional resources like the equipment necessary 
for chemical, biological or radiological hazards will not be necessary in order to prepare 
for an IID attack. Stockpiling fire-suppressing foam, dry chemical and dry powder (used 
for the extinguishment of combustible metals) is all that may be necessary to enhance our 
response capabilities. Conducting additional research and incorporating the ensuing 
knowledge in training programs, coupled with increased situational awareness, will help 
in achieving the National Preparedness Goal of providing an all-hazards approach to 
terrorism preparedness. Like the existing National Planning scenarios, new plans for both 
Urban and Wildland-WUI IIDs and firestorms and conflagrations will help prepare the 
nation to prevent, protect, respond and recover from all fires, whether from a terrorist 
attack or natural disaster.  
Another challenge is motivation. Stakeholders at all levels must be motivated to 
acknowledge the IID threat. In order to achieve this level of motivation stakeholders with 
key influence in the homeland security community (e.g. DHS, FBI, and DOD) must 
ensure that all stakeholders are cognizant of the threat from weaponized fire. Making the 
actions or inactions of these key players transparent to the public and the entire homeland 
security community greatly raises the stakes of inaction in the event of an IID attack.  
The final challenge is political. A critical component of overcoming any political 
resistance is to secure the combined endorsement of the U.S. Fire Administration 
(USFA), the National Fire Academy (NFA), and the International Association of 
Firefighters (IAFF). Another decisive action is to employ the media to assist in deterring 
possible detractors like the Department of Justice (DOJ) and law enforcement agencies 
who do not understand the consequences of fire. The media has the power to demonstrate 
to the public the consequences of ignoring IIDs and the potential of fire as a WMD. 
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To overcome resistance, this strategy will require buy-in from all stakeholders. 
Preparedness and response begins with local resources; it is therefore essential that the 
recognition of the IID threat be initiated on a local level, and more specifically that first 
responders – firefighters, emergency medical service providers, and fire marshals – push 
hardest to resolve this preparedness issue. As an entity within DHS, the U.S. Fire 
Administration is well-positioned to take a lead role in bringing the IID threat to the 
attention of other members of the homeland security community. The International 
Association of Firefighters (IAFF) and the National Fire Academy (NFA), as well as 
unions representing firefighters, fire officers, and emergency medical service personnel, 
who represent and train the nation’s first responders, are also important stakeholders. 
Coordinating efforts with these organizations will be imperative to successfully raising 
the level of national awareness to the threat of IIDs.   
5. Goals, Objectives, and Implementation Steps 
The goal of this strategy is to achieve a greater awareness and preparedness 
within the homeland security community of the terrorist threat posed by IIDs, 
conflagrations and firestorms. This can be accomplished through the publication of the 
present research, which proposes a new WMD matrix classification – CBIRNE – to 
include incendiary devices, and two new planning scenarios for wildland and urban 
conflagrations and firestorms.   
To increase preparedness, the National Fire Academy as well as local fire 
academies can develop response plans for conflagrations and firestorms. These new 
response plans can be incorporated into training curricula and exercises can be conducted 
to test the plans and the competency of local, state and federal agencies on their 
implementation. In addition, specialized equipment to manage fires from flammable 
gases, liquids, and solids must be procured and maintained.  The U.S. Fire Administration 
should require these endeavors to ensure preparedness. 
6. Evaluation Plan 
An evaluation plan is necessary to ensure the success of this strategy.  Monitoring 




                                                
trends are all important aspects of the evaluation plan. Ongoing performance evaluations 
will need to continue on a semi-annual basis to determine if the strategy is successful and 
if the performance targets are being met.  
B. PROPOSAL TO CHANGE CBRNE TO CBIRNE AND INCLUDE 
INCENDIARY DEVICES AND FIRE AS A WEAPON OF MASS 
DESTRUCTION 
The acronym CBRN stands for Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear 
weapons, and is synonymous, along with its predecessors ABC (atomic, biological, and 
chemical agents, used in the Cold War Era)106 and NBC (nuclear, bacteriological and 
chemical agents, utilized by NATO Forces)107 with WMD (Weapons of Mass 
Destruction). The United States civil defense extended CBRN to include conventional 
explosives, so it is now known as CBRNE. Although the definition of a WMD under U.S. 
law, Title 18 U.S.C. Section 2332a, includes incendiaries, the acronym CBRNE does not.  
Weapons of mass destruction are characterized as chemical, biological, radiological, 
nuclear, and explosive (CBRNE), and defined as:108   
• Any destructive device as listed in Section 921 of U.S. Code 18 to include:  
explosives, incendiaries, poison gases, bombs, grenades, or rockets 109 
• Poison gas 
• Any weapon involving a disease organism 
• Any weapon that is designed to release radiation at a level dangerous to 
human life. 
In 1996, the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici program established the first homeland 
security training programs to prepare U.S. cities to respond to terrorist attacks.110  
FEMA/USFA/NFA accordingly produced Emergency Response to Terrorism – the first 
terrorism training for first responders. This self-study guide listed five categories of 
 
106 Wikipedia, “NBC Weapon,” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ABC_weapons, [accessed July 25, 2006]. 
107 NATO-North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “SFOR Shows its NBC Means,” 
http://www.nato.int/sfor/indexinf/107/s107p12a/t01022112a.htm, [accessed July 25, 2006]. 
108 LII/Legal Information Institute, U.S. Code Collection, Title 18 > Part I > Chapter 113B > Section 
2332a, http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode18/usc_sec_18_00002332---a000-html, [accessed 
July 19, 2006].  
109 Onecle, “Crimes and Criminal Procedure – 18 U.S.C. Section 921,” 
http://law.onecle.com/uscode/18/921.html, [accessed July 19, 2006]. 
110 Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), “The Nunn-Lugar Vision, 1992-2002,” 
http://www.nti.org/e_research/nunn-lugar_history.pdf, [accessed June 13, 2006]. 
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terrorist incidents first responders might encounter: biological, nuclear, incendiary, 
chemical, and explosive.111 The acronym B-NICE was chosen as a simple way to 
remember the five incident types. It never caught on, however, and the CBRNE acronym 
developed by the Department of Defense and Domestic Preparedness programs was 
adopted.  The incendiary segment was either left off or combined with explosives and 
quickly forgotten. 
Incendiary devices are listed in the definition of weapons of mass destruction in 
Title 18 of U.S. Code Section 921, but are grouped with explosives. Given that the 
lethality and destructiveness of IIDs are so great, incendiary devices should again be 
separated from explosives and identified independently. Changing the CBRNE acronym 
to CBIRNE to include incendiaries allows the homeland security community, and all 
other agencies and disciplines of government, to recognize their significance.  
C. NATIONAL PLANNING SCENARIOS 
The goal of the National Strategy for Homeland Security is to provide a 
comprehensive plan to enhance protection and reduce vulnerability to terrorist attacks.112 
The National Preparedness Goal, mandated by Homeland Security Presidential 
Directive-8 (HSPD-8), can be achieved by using the National Planning Scenarios, 
Universal Task List and the Target Capabilities List. This common approach for national 
preparedness is based on the four homeland security missions - prevention, protection, 
response, and recovery.  
Together these capabilities-based planning tools establish measurable readiness 
that balances risk with resources across the nation:  
• The National Planning Scenarios – illustrate the potential threat and 
magnitude of terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies.  
• The Universal Task List (UTL) – provides the tasks to identify the 
resources required to prevent, respond to, and recover from attacks, 
disasters and emergencies.  
 
111 FEMA/USFA/NFA, “Emergency Response to Terrorism Self-Study,” 
http://www.usfa.dhs.gov/downloads/pdf/publications/ertss.pdf, [accessed July 11, 2006] 
112 National Strategy for Homeland Security Washington, D.C: Office of Homeland Security, 
Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, July 2002), abstract.  
• The Target Capabilities List (TCL) – provides the capabilities and 
outcomes used to identify measurable readiness target.113  
Figure 1 illustrates how the National Preparedness Goal, Homeland Security 
Presidential Directives, NIMS, the NRP and NIPP are all integrated to support the 
National Strategy for Homeland Security.114  
 
 
Figure 5. The National Strategy for Homeland Security 
  
The National Planning Scenarios are the first step in the capabilities-based 
planning process. Fifteen scenarios were developed to provide an illustration of the 
potential threats to national, state, and local homeland security preparedness. These 
National Planning Scenarios are designed as a reference for all levels of government to 
identify the scope, magnitude, and complexity of potential major events.115
                                                 
113 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Preparedness Goal (final draft), (Washington, 
D.C.: Department of Homeland Security, December 2005), 6. 
114 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Preparedness Goal (final draft), (Washington, 
D.C.: Department of Homeland Security, December 2005), 2. 
115 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Planning Scenarios: Executive Summaries, 
(Washington, D.C.: Department of Homeland Security, April 2005), ii.  
49 
50 
                                                
Scenarios were developed for natural disasters as well as for weapons of mass 
destruction in the CBRNE matrix. But two scenarios are conspicuously absent: IID/Urban 
Conflagration/Firestorm and IID/Wildland-WUI Conflagration/Firestorm attack. These 
scenarios are essential to fully implement HSPD-8 on national preparedness, and to help 
achieve the National Preparedness Goal.   
Five of the fifteen scenarios (nuclear detonation, industrial chemical attack, 
chlorine tank explosion, earthquake, and IED) could cause massive and uncontrollable 
fires far worse than any of the multiple hazards described for each scenario. In these 
scenarios, fire is mentioned only cursorily, most likely because of limited fire service 
representation in their development. The planners developing the scenarios either did not 
contemplate the consequences of fire, or dismissed it as an everyday occurrence easily 
dispatched by the fire department.  
The Improvised Nuclear Device (IND) attack depicted in Scenario 1 contains only 
two sentences addressing fire: “A nuclear detonation will also produce a great deal of 
thermal (heat) energy that will cause burns to exposed skin (and eyes),” and “It is likely 
that the blast and subsequent fires will destroy all buildings in the immediate area of 
detonation.”116 The latter sentence combines blast and fire damage, which leads the 
reader to believe the blast damage is responsible for most of the destruction.  
National Planning Scenario 6: Chemical Attack – Toxic Industrial Chemicals 
acknowledges major fires from petroleum refineries and cargo ships as a significant 
consequence of the attack. However, firefighting is mentioned superficially as just one of 
the eight actions necessary for hazard mitigation. The firefighting procedures necessary 
to mitigate this incident would be extensive and complicated: special equipment, along 
with substantial quantities of fire suppressing foam, would be required to control the 
flammable liquid and spill fires of this magnitude.  
The Chlorine Tank Explosion described in Scenario 8, although not flammable, 
would react violently with other chemicals to create fires that produce deadly products of 
combustion. Emergency Response Guidebook (ERG2004) Guide #24 states that although 
 
116 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Planning Scenarios: Executive Summaries 
(Washington, D.C.: Department of Homeland Security, April 2005), 1-3.  
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chlorine does not burn, it is a strong oxidizer and will react vigorously or explosively 
with many materials (including fuels) and support combustion.117 The toxic effects of the 
release are a major concern of hazardous material. Unless there is a major source of 
ignition present and the chlorine is confined to allow the concentration to remain in the 
flammable range, the fire hazard becomes the primary hazard. Many terrorist groups have 
chemists in their organization and are cognizant of this dual hazard. Under the right 
conditions, a chlorine tank explosion can cause both fire and a toxic chemical release. Yet 
the chlorine tank explosion scenario fails to address this dual hazard. 
Earthquakes have the potential to cause massive fires, yet the Natural Disaster 
Scenario 9 conspicuously ignores the potential for a firestorm, even though the initial 
earthquake causes only about two percent of the damage.118 The scenario addresses 
service disruptions from the rupture of underground fuel, oil and natural gas lines but 
fails to mention the risks from fire. Fires igniting after an earthquake have the potential to 
develop into firestorms due to compromised water systems and availability of firefighting 
units to respond. Even according to the scenario there is a limited capacity to battle fires 
and search for trapped victims in collapsed buildings; assistance may have to come from 
outside cities with mutual aid agreements. This is a prime example of the need for fire 
suppression planning.     
The improvised explosive devices (IEDs) scenario focuses on blast damage from 
the IED; the scenario groups the fire hazard with six other primary hazards: toxic smoke, 
un-detonated explosives, unstable structures, electrical hazards, and low visibility. In this 
scenario, like the others, the fire service is assumed to be performing its core competency 
and is taken for granted.  
The objective of the National Planning Scenarios is for all levels of government to 
identify the potential scope, magnitude, and complexity of major events. This thesis 
includes a proposal to develop two new proposed National Planning Scenarios: #16 
IID/Urban Conflagration/Firestorm and #17 IID/Wildland-WUI Conflagration/Firestorm. 
 
117 North American Hazardous Materials Emergency Guidebook, “ERG 2004, Guide #24 – Chlorine.” 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Transportation, Research and Special Programs Administration, 
n.d).  
118 Dennis Smith, San Francisco is Burning: The Untold Story of the 1906 Earthquake and Fires 
(New York: Viking, 2005), 269. 
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Scenario #16 is proposed initially for use by the fire service in an urban setting and 
Scenario #17, if approved by the National Wildfire Coordinating Group (NWCG), could 
serve as a guide for fire departments within wildland and WUI environments. Both 
scenarios, or some variation thereof, should be adopted by the U.S. Fire Administration, 
the National Fire Academy, the National Interagency Fire Center (NIFC) and ultimately 
DHS to supplement the fifteen National Planning Scenarios in current use.     
1.  Planning Scenario # 16: IID - Urban Conflagration/Firestorm  
 
Executive Summary 
Casualties 1,500 fatalities, 25,000 hospitalizations 
Infrastructure Damage Total, within a 1-mile radius 
Evacuations / Displaced Persons 50,000 assisted and self-evacuations 
Contamination Products of Combustion 
Economic Impact Billions 
Potential for Multiple Events Yes 
Recovery Timeline Years 
Table 1.   Executive Summary of Urban Conflagration/Firestorm 
 
a. Scenario General Description:   
A spring snowstorm was descending upon New York City in late March. 
Snow was falling heavily, reducing visibility to about 100 feet. The weather was perfect, 
Mohammad thought, as he slowly loosened the gas-line coupling in the basement of the 
huge apartment complex; he was planting his homemade igniter (potassium chlorate and 
sugar – directions courtesy of “Arson Around with Auntie ALF”). Almost two years in 
the planning, New York City would awaken to a fiery chaos. Two cells had placed twenty-
five IIDs on points of the compass across the New York metropolitan area.  The first few 
would go off in the warehouse district as a diversion; these would be followed an hour 
later with a half-dozen high-rise apartment explosions in the upper floors, which would 
clog traffic and create chaos. His cell phone beeped as he climbed into the back seat of 
the car that quickly disappeared down the alley. A smile came across his face as he 
glanced at his watch: 6:00 A.M. In the distance the faint sounds of sirens drifted through 
the air; the first fire was already at a five-alarm.   
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In this scenario, agents of the Universal Adversary (UA) use improvised 
incendiary devices (IIDs) to ignite four separate fires in proximity of each other but 
strategically placed throughout different sectors of metropolitan area. Unlike simple 
arson, these IIDs are weapons designed to create a large area fire with the potential to 
develop into a conflagration or firestorm. The UA-utilized incendiary weapons are 
composed of a combination of materials such as gasoline, high temperature accelerants, 
napalm, thermite, or white phosphorus. These are simultaneously ignited with initial 
explosives strategically placed in high-rise commercial and residential buildings, 
industrial complexes of buildings with heavy timber and mill construction, and residential 
homes of brick and joist or wood-frame construction. Thirty minutes later, as a subway 
train transverses an under-river tunnel, two incendiary fires ignite: one on the train and 
the other in the under-river tunnel.  
b. Planning Considerations 
(1) Geographical Considerations/Description – 
The incident is designed for an urban environment; casualty estimates 
would be reduced in less populous cities. The primary urban location for this scenario 
would be a large city like New York, Chicago, or Detroit, with a mixed occupancy of 
commercial and residential buildings and probably an underground transportation system.  
(2) Timeline/Event Dynamics –  
The response timeline begins with the identification of the fires 
and the response of the fire department. Initial firefighting procedures will be conducted 
by the first arriving fire units to protect life and property by performing rescues and by 
locating, confining and extinguishing the fires. An accurate and complete size-up will be 
conducted to determine if an offensive or defensive strategy will be employed.   
The simultaneous events throughout the city will require the 
normal response to alarms to be adjusted to a reduced response mode, decreasing the 
number of units responding to each fire. The Incident Commander will implement the 
Incident Command System to manage the incident, in full compliance with the guidelines 
set forth by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the National Incident 
Management System (NIMS). 
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(3) Mission Areas Activated – 
Prevention/Deterrence: IIDs are inexpensive, readily available and 
tactically simple to use. The ability to prevent and deter an IID attack would be 
challenging.   
Infrastructure Protection: The pre-event planning stage could be 
used to ensure proper security measures are in place and fire protection systems are in 
proper working order.    
Preparedness: Firefighters and EMS are properly trained to 
perform their assigned missions to National Fire Academy standards. Mutual aid 
agreements must be in place and exercised.   
Emergency Assessment/Diagnosis: The initial size-up at these 
incidents could indicate arson or an IID attack and the potential for a firestorm. Proper 
notifications to higher command must be transmitted immediately. The potential exists 
for the entire city to be destroyed by fire. 
Emergency Management/Response: Immediate action requires 
search and rescue, fire containment, additional resources, air reconnaissance, the 
implementation of ICS, and the activation of an Incident Management Team. 
Hazard Mitigation: Contain and extinguish the fire through 
various extinguishing methods compatible with the fire and occupancy: large-caliber 
water streams, foam, dry chemical or dry powder. 
Evacuation/Shelter: The potential for a firestorm and building 
collapse requires evacuation of the population within the surrounding area.  The use of 
law enforcement is necessary to assist in evacuation and traffic control.   
Victim Care: Injuries will include burns, smoke inhalation, 
respiratory distress and trauma. EMS will triage and track patients on scene and provide 
transportation to appropriate hospitals. A determination must be made that medical 
facilities will not be exposed to an expanding firestorm.  
Investigation/Apprehension: Investigation during the mitigation 
phase by fire marshals and law enforcement will not be possible due to radiant heat and 
collapse potential of structures. Coordination of federal, state, and local investigative 
resources will be necessary following the extinguishment of the fire.  
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Recovery/Remediation: Firestorms and conflagrations have the 
ability to completely destroy an entire city. Essential services will be non-existent. 
Thousands of people will need to be relocated. Long-term medical care will be required 
for both physiological and psychological injuries. Recovery will require clean-up and 
rebuilding, which will take years and cost billions of dollars.  
c. Key Implications 
Terrorist groups employing IIDs simultaneously ignite fires in separate, 
strategically-located sectors throughout New York City.  Fires ignited on the lower floors 
of high-rise buildings with sabotaged fire protections systems trap people above the fire 
with no chance of escape or rescue. As most resources are battling the high-rise fires, 
additional fires burn out of control in different sectors of the city. As these individual 
fires burn and intensify over the city, the fires unite and develop into a conflagration 
consuming entire neighborhoods, critical infrastructure and key resources.  
The simultaneously-ignited fires contribute to the volume of heated and 
buoyantly rising air from each fire zone. As the fires feed upon themselves and as smaller 
fires converge, cool air is sucked into the vacuum left by the expelled hot air. Winds or 
updrafts of over 100 miles per hour are generated. Cyclonic winds carry flames, fireballs, 
hot embers, billows of smoke, and large objects aloft. Volatile gases generated by the 
intense heat explode in the air, causing flames to spread in outward surges. The 
temperature in a firestorm can exceed 1,000 degrees Celsius, which will melt glass and 
metal and burn ordinary fireproof materials. The consequence of a firestorm is total 
devastation within the affected area. 
There will be thousands of civilian and emergency personnel casualties 
due to burns and exposure to toxic gases. Hospitals will be destroyed and the limited 
number of burn care centers nationwide will be inadequate to treat the thousands of burn 
victims.   
The firestorms or conflagrations will destroy critical infrastructure, both 
physical and cyber-based, including but not limited to telecommunications, energy, 
banking and finance, transportation, water systems and emergency services, essential to 
the continuity of the government (COG) and economy of the United States.   
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2. Planning Scenario #17: IID - Wildland-WUI Conflagration/Firestorm 
An important factor contributing to the destructiveness of wildland fire is 
that structural firefighters are trained and equipped differently from wildland firefighters. 
Urban firefighters rely on the water systems provided in urban settings, and count on 
catching the fire in its early stages. Often, neither of these situations exists in WUI. 
Wildland firefighters have no ready water supply except what they transport to the site. 
They also anticipate larger fires, and are thus trained to fight the fire from its perimeter, 
clearing fuel to prevent spread. Complications often arise with WUI fires, and the IID 
terrorist component amplifies these problems.     
 
Executive Summary 
Casualties < 500 
Infrastructure Damage 100,000 to 500,000 acres 
Evacuations / Displaced Persons 10,000-20,000 
Contamination Products of Combustion, Watersheds 
Economic Impact Billions 
Potential for Multiple Events Yes 
Recovery Timeline Decades 




                                                
a. Scenario General Description 
In the early morning hours, the L.A. County Terrorism Early Warning 
Group (TEW) received reports of the multiple fires burning out of control in New York 
City. Just before dawn, TEW received additional reports of a massive wildland fire 
burning out of control and moving toward a residential development in L.A. County. 
Shortly thereafter, a message was broadcast on a foreign news network, stating: “The 
American infidels will all die in hell fire; there will be no escape from the flames — the 
wrath of Allah will sweep down upon you as the desert wind, consuming your miserable 
lives and razing your dwelling places.  You will be unable to flee Allah’s deadly breath. 
Allahu Akbar! (God is great.)”   
In this scenario, agents of the Universal Adversary (UA) use improvised 
incendiary devices (IIDs) to ignite hundreds of individual fires within close proximity to 
each other, but strategically placed throughout different segments of a Wildland and 
WUI. The incendiary weapons are composed of materials such as gasoline, high 
temperature accelerants, napalm, thermite, white phosphorus or something as simple as a 
road flare. IIDs are ignited from the ground and the air in areas where the forest is most 
vulnerable to rapid ignition and fire growth, taking advantage of the topographical 
conditions to rapidly extend the fire. The UA also mimics the Japanese Balloon Bombs of 
World War II,  in which Japan launched thousands of balloons carrying incendiary 
devices across the Pacific Ocean, some landing as far east as Michigan.119 These balloons 
are released at night to avoid detection; flying at low altitudes they crash into the forest 
igniting thousands of fires. Under ideal fire conditions of drought, high winds, and 
excessive ground fuel, these IID weapons are designed to create a multitude of large fires 
that will travel unimpeded for miles, burning areas of forest, homes and critical 
infrastructure. Many of these fires coalesce into a large area fire, generating tremendous 
heat and developing into a massive fire. As they continue to grow and merge with other 
large fires a conflagration arises, and if sufficient heat is built up, there is also a strong 
possibility of a firestorm developing.   
 
 
119 United States Air Force Museum, “Japanese Balloon Bombs,” 
http://www.wpafb.af.mil/museum/history/wwii/jbb.htm, [accessed July 17, 2006]. 
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b. Planning Considerations:  
(1) Geographical Considerations/Description – 
The incident is designed for a Wildland and WUI; casualty 
estimates would increase as unimpeded fires extend into suburban and urban 
environments. California was probably the first state to experience this phenomenon, and 
has endured several devastating fires. One extreme example of a WUI fire occurred in 
October 1991, when wildland fire broke out in urban Oakland Park. It spread throughout 
an intermix area, and ignited much of the adjacent urban area. Twenty-five people were 
trapped and killed, and more than 3,000 homes were destroyed. The Rodeo-Chediski Fire 
in Arizona in the summer of 2002 destroyed 426 structures and burned 462,000 acres.120 
The primary wildland and WUI locations can be anywhere in the U.S., but the north- and 
southwest are the most susceptible. 
(2) Timeline/Event Dynamics –  
The response timeline begins with the identification of the fires 
and the response of the local fire departments. The kind and number of resources 
responding to initial attack varies depending upon the fire danger, fuel type, and the 
values to be protected. Initial firefighting procedures will be conducted by the first group 
fire units to protect life and property. Early evacuation of homes and towns is of primary 
importance. Firefighter and public safety is the first priority at wildland fires; thus, 
requests for mutual aid and assistance from an Incident Management Team are called for 
without delay. The simultaneous fires throughout the area will necessitate a limited or 
non-response to those fires with low life-hazard or critical infrastructure potential. All 
personnel will follow the procedures in the Fireline Handbook published by National 





120 Science & Policy Brief, “Summary of Rodeo-Chediski Fire, Arizona: June 18-July 7, 2002,” The 
Wilderness Society, Ecology and Economics Research Department no. 8 (March 2003), 
http://www.wilderness.org/Library/Documents/upload/Summary-of-the-Rodeo-Chediski-Fire-AZ-
PDF.pdf#search=%22Rodeo-Chediski%20Fire%20in%20Arizona%20%22, [accessed August 23, 2006]. 
121 Incident Operations Standards Working Team, National Wildfire Coordinating Group, NWCG 
Handbook 3 (Boise ID: National Interagency Fire Center, March 2004), 
http://www.nwcg.gov/pms/pubs/large.html#FirelineHandbook, [accessed August 15, 2006]. 
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(3) Mission Areas Activated – 
Prevention/Deterrence: IIDs are inexpensive, readily available and 
tactically simple to use. The ability to prevent and deter an IID attack would be 
challenging.   
Infrastructure Protection: The pre-event planning stage could be 
used to ensure prescribed burns are conducted in vulnerable areas and that firewise 
practices are in place. Prevention measures include creating a defensible space around all 
structures, using fire-resistant construction, and developing an emergency access and 
disaster plan in the event of a wildfire.  
Preparedness: Prescribed burning by the National Forestry Service 
removes fuel from the path of a future fire from an IID attack and can protect specific 
buildings, cultural resources, critical natural resources, and habitats. Ensure sufficient 
resources are available and equipment caches ordered to set up for necessary activation 
and deployment. Conduct year-round training for all wildland firefighting and IMT 
positions. 
Emergency Assessment/Diagnosis: The initial size-up at these 
incidents could indicate arson or an IID attack and the potential for a massive fire. 
Conduct aerial reconnaissance to determine the number of fires and their perimeters. 
Proper notifications to higher command must be transmitted immediately. The potential 
exists for the wildland fire to involve wildland-urban interface, suburban and urban 
surroundings.  
Emergency Management/Response: The Incident Command 
System is employed.  Ensure the command and general staff positions are filled and 
necessary resources are available. Prepare for an extended attack once the complexity 
levels exceed initial attack capabilities.   
Hazard Mitigation: Use aircraft to drop fire retardant and water. 
Line crews and bulldozers are used to establish fire lines. Task forces and strike teams are 
employed to extinguish fires, and protect structures. Residents are evacuated from their 
homes when necessary.   
Evacuation/Shelter: There will be little or no warning during the 
acute stage of the fire. Many homes in the wildland-urban interface will be quickly 
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engulfed by the large area fires and generate many fatalities. Shelter-in-place is not an 
option; evacuation is mandatory. However, access and egress routes are limited; many 
residents will be trapped. Helicopter evacuation may be necessary.   
Victim Care: Injuries will include burns, smoke inhalation, 
respiratory distress and trauma. Pre-hospital medical will be limited. Medical facilities 
will be a distance away, delaying transportation of victims to the appropriate medical 
facilities.  
Investigation/Apprehension: Investigation during the mitigation 
phase by fire marshals and law enforcement will not be possible until the fire burns itself 
out.  Coordination of federal, state, and local investigative resources will be necessary 
following the extinguishment of the fire.  
Recovery/Remediation: Firestorms and conflagrations have the 
ability to completely destroy a large section of forest as well as nearby towns and cities. 
Essential services will be non-existent. Thousands of people will need to be relocated. 
Long-term medical care will be required for both physiological and psychological 
injuries.  Recovery will require clean-up and rebuilding that will take decades and cost 
billions of dollars.  
c. Key Implications 
Terrorist groups employing the many forms of IIDs available to ignite 
hundreds of simultaneous and strategically-located fires throughout wildland and 
wildland-urban interfaces will devastate the area and the environment. As these 
individual fires burn and intensify throughout the forest, the fires could join together to 
create an extremely large area fire. Depending on the atmospheric conditions and winds, 
this fire could develop into an advancing line fire miles long. Also, the volume of heated 
and rising air from each fire zone could increase to significant levels and develop into 
firestorms. In this scenario fire classification is irrelevant, since both types of fires have 
the potential to consume large sections of the forest and extend into suburban and urban 
areas, causing total destruction throughout their path.  
Critical infrastructures and key resources will be destroyed by the fire. The 
destruction of telecommunication towers will severely affect vital first responder 
communications. Whole towns and cities will lose power when the electrical substations 
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and power lines burn. The after-effects of the fire will pollute reservoirs and watersheds, 
leaving communities without fresh water. In addition, the smoke plume generated from 
these fires will create a myriad of problems such as respiratory problems. The smoke will 
also interfere with air traffic and vehicles traveling on nearby roads. Many other critical 
infrastructures and key resources will be affected, including continuity of government 
and the country’s economy. 
As Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff states in the revised 
Target Capabilities List, in order to meet the twenty-first-century challenges facing this 
nation, 
…we must understand performance requirements for a major event at the 
task level and build and maintain the capabilities required to perform those 
tasks.  Preparedness for major events assumes a coordinated and shared 
response that involves all levels of government, the private sector, non-
government organizations, and citizens.122  
The two scenarios above can help to ensure preparedness in the event of a conflagration 
or firestorm no matter the source or cause.  
 
122 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Target Capabilities List: A Companion to the National 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The goal of the National Strategy for Homeland Security is to provide a 
comprehensive plan to enhance protection against and reduce vulnerability to terrorist 
attacks. The nation must anticipate terrorist groups employing weaponized fire as an 
asymmetric weapon. Reducing the risk of IIDs and weaponized fire used by terrorist 
groups can be accomplished in a number of ways. The first step is to recognize IIDs as a 
threat and gain an awareness of our vulnerabilities to and the consequences of such an 
attack. Changing the WMD matrix from CBRNE to CBIRNE to include incendiary 
devices will promote this awareness at all levels. 
Capabilities-based planning tools like the National Planning Scenarios, Universal 
Task List and the Target Capabilities List aid in our national preparedness. The addition 
of the proposed urban and wildland/WUI planning scenarios for conflagrations or 
firestorms can further prepare us for an IID attack and aid in achieving the four homeland 
security missions:  prevention, protection, response, and recovery. 
Threat reduction can also be achieved by applying protective measures to 
decrease our vulnerability and lower the consequences of an IID attack. Building code 
changes can be made to improve building and occupancy safety, including increased 
resistance to building collapse; redundancy of fire protections systems; improved egress 
for occupants; and improved access for first responders. The U.S. Forest Service can 
reduce wildland fire risk through forest treatment projects that will restore ecological 
structures and protect human life, property, critical infrastructure, and key resources.  
Residents of WUI can help to protect their homes and nearby structures from wildland 
fires by following firewise practices.123  
Emergency responders’ ability to respond to weaponized fire and extreme fire 
events (like conflagrations or firestorms) depends on three fundamentals: 
• Capability – unique skills that emergency responders perform. 
 
123 Front Range Fuel Treatment Partnership Roundtable, “Living with Fire: Protecting Communities 
and Restoring Forests,” 
http://www.wilderness.org/Library/Documents/loader.cfm?url=/commonspot/security/getfile.cfm&PageID
=14899, [accessed August 9, 2006]. 
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• Capacity – how many resources or trained personnel are available. 
• Proficiency – how well emergency responders perform each task.124 
The capability of emergency responders can be increased through specialized training 
and proper equipment, including the appropriate extinguishing medium necessary for the 
many flammable and combustible solids, liquids, and gases. The knowledge and training 
required for this equipment is paramount to achieving this capability. In order to 
maximize emergency responders’ capacity to respond and mitigate disasters like 
conflagrations or firestorms, each agency must insure a proper recall system is in place, 
as well as sufficient mutual aid agreements with other cities. Proficiency is dependent on 
proper response plans, scenarios and well-implemented exercises.  
Response to an extreme terrorist event or natural disaster resulting in a 
conflagration or firestorm will initially be managed by local first responders. It is 
important that all emergency responders and agencies operate together under a unified 
command of the Incident Command System. The synergetic results of each agency 
working together within their core competency will enhance the control and mitigation of 
the disaster. While the fire service is conducting fire suppression, pre-hospital emergency 
care, and search and rescue, law enforcement can be simultaneously performing 
evacuation, site security, force protection and investigation. Force protection is 
particularly important; all first responders are susceptible to attack while performing their 
duties. Although local emergency responders and medical facilities will be overwhelmed 
due to the magnitude of the event, a cohesive local response will allow for a smooth and 
unencumbered transition as state and federal resources arrive to augment the local 
response.  
Terrorists select their tactics based on a number of factors: the risks to their group, 
impact on the target, media exposure, and the effect of recruitment.125  IIDs present a 
minimal risk to a terrorist group, are easy to acquire, safe to handle and employ, and 
difficult to detect. The destructiveness of fire guarantees impact on a target will be  
124 Joseph Pfeifer, “Command Resiliency:  An Adaptive Response Strategy for Complex Incidents,” 
Naval Postgraduate School Thesis, 7, https://www.hsdl.org/homesec/docs/theses/05Sep_Pfeifer.pdf, 
[accessed August 11, 2006]. 
125 Rollie Lal and Brian A. Jackson, “Change and Continuity in Terrorism Revisited:  Terrorist 
Tactics, 1980-2005,” The MIPT Terrorism Annual 2006, 23, 
http://www.tkb.org/documents/Downloads/2006-MIPT-Terrorism-Annual.pdf, [accessed August 18, 2006]. 
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substantial. The sensationalism of fires will act as an effective recruitment vehicle; 
indeed, the extensive media exposure in itself makes IIDs an attractive weapon for 
terrorist groups. Currently, IEDs and bombings have been the most effective means for 
terrorist groups to carry out their mission. Nonetheless, the various targets and tactics 
used by groups will most likely shift as our counter-terrorism measures improve.  
Terrorist groups will likely adjust their strategies and tactics to employ IIDs as their 
weapon of choice. 
The use of fire as a terrorist weapon has all the characteristics of a predictable 
surprise. Bazerman and Watkins offer four suggestions on how organizations can avoid 
being predictably surprised: 
• Scan the environment and collect sufficient information regarding all 
significant threats. 
• Integrate and analyze information from multiple sources within the 
organization to produce insights that can be acted upon. 
• Respond in a timely manner and observe the results. 
• In the aftermath, reflect on what happened and incorporate lessons-learned 
to avoid repetition of past mistakes.126 
DHS and the entire homeland security community can prevent weaponized fire 
from becoming the next predictable surprise by following these four steps:  1) Become 
aware of the threat and collect intelligence on IIDs; 2) Take action on the credibility of 
this threat by including “I” in WMD matrix CBIRNE and produce planning scenarios for 
all levels of government to use as a reference and as a training tool; 3) Immediately begin 
to take necessary measures to reduce the risk by lowering our vulnerability and the 
consequences of an attack; and 4) If an attack does occur, be prepared to mitigate and 
incorporate lessons learned to prevent another attack. 
Unfortunately, the homeland security community has yet to recognize the 
enormity of the threat, vulnerability and consequence from IIDs as a terrorist weapon.  As 
a result, the U.S. is unprepared for the prevention of or response to IIDs. Unless this 
threat is acknowledged by entire homeland security community as significant, and action  
 
 
126  Bazerman and Watkins, Predictable Surprises, 97. 
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is immediately taken on this threat, the U.S. will not be properly prepared to prevent or 
respond to an IID attack when it occurs. This thesis is intended to act as a catalyst for 
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